513 Armed Forces & Society Volume 32 Number 4 July 2006 513-531 © 2006 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. All rights reserved. 10.1177/0095327X06288030 http://afs.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com Undermining Combat Readiness in the Russian Military, 1992–2005 Dale R. Herspring Kansas State University, Manhattan Focusing on four critical components of combat cohesion—leadership, morale, trust, and training—the author argues that under Boris Yeltsin, combat cohesion deteriorated to the point where the Russian military was not in a position to carry out combat operations— as demonstrated by the army’s poor showing in the First Chechen War. As a result, the military that Putin inherited was in shambles. Planes were not flying, ships were not sail- ing, and soldiers were not training. While the outcome is not assured, Putin has provided the generals with the two factors they value the most: stability and predictability. For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the steep decline in combat readiness has begun to be reversed—even so, success is not assured, and there is a long way to go before Moscow will be able to boast of an army approaching that fielded by the Soviets. Keywords: Russian military; combat cohesion; combat readiness The demoralization of a once organized military machine in certain military units is going so far that there is a potential threat both to Russian society and to the Army itself. —Boris Yeltsin Since the Russian military was created in 1992, its combat readiness declined until very recently. This raises the obvious question why? What has happened to this once- mighty superpower? What has brought it to the point where a number of experts would argue that it is no longer capable of fighting a war against a serious opponent? This arti- cle will argue that a key variable is the loss of unit cohesion. Indeed, the primary thesis of this article is the following: Unit cohesion in the Russian Army was seriously under- mined under Yeltsin resulting in a loss of combat readiness; some progress has been made in restoring unit cohesion by Putin, but much remains to be done. 1 While modern weapons and equipment are important in combat readiness, the key to unit cohesion is personnel. It is the soldier or sailor who must carry out orders, and anything that destroys his or her willingness or ability to do so or that negatively affects leadership, morale, or trust will inevitably hurt the army’s ability to carry out its mission successfully. Author’s Note: The author expresses his appreciation to Joseph Aistrup, Patricia Shields, and three unnamed reviewers.