NORC at the University of Chicago Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination Author(s): Haig R. Nalbantian and Andrew Schotter Source: Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-31 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Society of Labor Economists and the NORC at the University of Chicago Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2535305 Accessed: 23-10-2019 03:16 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2535305?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms NORC at the University of Chicago, Society of Labor Economists, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Labor Economics This content downloaded from 67.241.71.216 on Wed, 23 Oct 2019 03:16:48 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms