What does this all amount to? Glaser offers his theory, quite sensibly, as “normative”: It describes what states should do if they were rational cost–benefit calculators making choices with reference to the variables he identifies. Indeed, he demonstrates ably that we can tell fairly persuasive sto- ries about world politics from such a baseline. Along the way, however, he also shows that, whatever we call them, “paradigms” still delineate intellectual styles and commu- nities in IR. First, while noting the “realist lineage” of his frame- work, Glaser argues for avoiding a “debate over terminol- ogy” irrelevant to the “substance” of his “analysis” (p. 15). But the significance of his arguments—let alone a good many of the debates that occupy his attention—is likely to elude many nonrealists. Second, despite Glaser’s unusu- ally careful attempt to engage with nonrealist traditions, my nonsystematic estimate is that not a single “construc- tivist” scholar who Barkin cites as an exemplar of realist- constructivist theorizing is cited by Glaser in any capacity whatsoever. In other words, Glaser’s intellectual map of the field, to the extent that it reflects that of mainstream realism, is radically different from Barkin’s. This difference helps account for the reason that Bar- kin’s arguments are unlikely to move many self-identified realists. Some view what Barkin bemoans about contem- porary realist theory as features rather than bugs. Others will consider the absence of any middle-range theories, let alone empirical content, evidence of an underlying vacuous- ness in Barkin’s vision. In this respect, much of the post- paradigmism crowd will find little of interest beyond Barkin’s criticisms of paradigmism. Indeed, he faces a fundamental dilemma: how to simultaneously oppose par- adigmism and yet build a book entirely around a discus- sion of international relations theory. The fact that he carries this off at all is a testament to his tenacity. If, as I expect, postparadigmism is emerging as the dominant paradigm force in U.S. international relations, then the question “whence realism?” is likely to be of diminishing interest in the field. If this is the case, then Glaser’s book occupies an important Janus-faced posi- tion. It stands as a (possibly definitive) coda for a series of debates that dominated the security subfield in the 1980s and 1990s. In its self-conscious transcendence of realism and presentation as a strategic-choice theory (albeit with realist roots), it may reflect the beginning of the end for “Big Realism” as a substantively distinctive mode of inquiry. This suggests that the odds weigh against Barkin’s book making much of a dent on the realist imagination. Instead, it may signal an increasing, if largely unacknowledged, passing of Machiavelli’s torch to scholars outside of what Glaser terms the “realist lineage.” While not necessarily a cause for celebration, it could be much worse for everyone involved—whether they choose to follow Glaser’s or Bar- kin’s path. Ethnic Cues: The Role of Shared Ethnicity in Latino Political Participation. By Matt A. Barreto. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010. 200p. $65.00. doi:10.1017/S1537592711003197 — John A. Garcia, University of Michigan This book examines the dynamics of the presence of Latino candidates relative to Latino electorates’ responses, that is, turnout, candidate choice, and ethnically targeted mobi- lization. Matt A. Barreto uses multiple methods and data sources to explore these relationships. In doing so, he raises the following question: “Specifically does the presence of Latino candidates mobilize the Latino electorate resulting in elevated turnout and strong support for the co-ethnic candidates?” (p. 5). Barreto has established himself as a major contributor in the areas of the political behavior, public opinion, and survey research of Latinos and other minorities. The inte- gral concepts to this research effort are shared ethnicity, identity politics, mobilizing forces, voter support, and eth- nic group consciousness. He develops an electoral model of co-ethnic electoral behavior that applies both when a Latino candidate is present and when one is not. If one is present, Latino co-ethnics will demonstrate political atti- tudes and behaviors in the following ways: 1) They will be more politically aware and interested in the election and the candidates; 2) they will more likely be contacted by co-ethnic campaigns; 3) they will determine the group benefits of supporting a co-ethnic candidate; and 4) they will be more psychologically engaged in the electoral pro- cess. According to Barreto, Latino voters who have higher levels of ethnic identity will be more likely to support and vote for the co-ethnic candidate. This support can tran- scend party affiliation, leading voters to support the co-ethnic candidate even if their party identification is different from the candidate’s party affiliation. The evidence provided by Ethnic Cues includes elite interviews, exit surveys, ecological analysis based upon vot- ing records and demographic data at the precinct level, and general surveys of Latino populations. By means of different modes of analysis, Barreto’s results serve to iden- tify the linkages between co-ethnic candidates and co-ethnic electoral behaviors. The author concludes that the pres- ence of Latino candidates has the mobilization effect of increasing both Latino turnout and Latino support for these candidates. The success of mobilization efforts by co-ethnic candidates that target Latino voters will depend on viable or competitive Latino candidates and a growing Latino electorate. Barreto states early that “[n]o comprehensive body of empirical evidence has suggested that ethnicity is salient for Latinos and no coherent theory exists for separating out the role of co-ethnic candidates and the role of party affiliation” (p. 4). He adds that a “handful of studies have examined the connection between ethnicity and political December 2011 | Vol. 9/No. 4 905