FALLIBILISM, LIBERALISM AND STILWELL’S ADVOCACY FOR PLURALISM IN ECONOMICS Edward Mariyani-Squire and Margaret Moussa This article examines avenues for resolving what appears to be an inherent tension in the fallibilist argument for pluralism in economics. Fallibilism is the strongest argument for pluralism because it recognises that any one theory is likely to be incomplete and may contain hidden errors. However fallibilism undermines itself in advocating paradigm pluralism because it implicitly accepts that scientific inquiry can lead to paradigm monism. We consider definitions of ‘scientific’ and the limits of liberal pluralism in resolving this tension, focusing on the contributions of Australia’s foremost advocate of pluralism, Frank Stilwell (2002, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2011). Arguments for Paradigm Pluralism in Economics The topic of pluralism in economics has come to the fore in discussions about the nature and trajectory of the discipline (e.g. Garnett, Olsen & Starr, 2009; Fullbrook, 2008). Pluralism, as distinct from plurality, is essentially a normative term: it amounts to the advocacy of plurality. Pluralists maintain that a variety of perspectives, accounts, beliefs and approaches to action should exist and should be striven for. With respect to economics, one may advocate the plurality of philosophical foundations (preconceptions about the nature of reality, knowledge and ethical precepts per se), methodological positions (epistemic goals, rules and criteria of assessment), theoretical frameworks (elementary ‘genetic’ propositions characterising a theoretical worldview or general understanding of economic phenomena), theories (speculative accounts of certain economic phenomena), models (potentially quantifiable specifications of a theory), or methods (specific procedures for