44 Copyright © 2023 Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Airlangga Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik ISSN: (Print 2086-7050) / (Online 2528-6013) https://doi.org/10.20473/mkp.V36I12023.44-57 Epistocracy vs constitutional democracy: A Hayekian response to Jason Brannan Epistocracy vs demokrasi konstitusi: Respon Hayekian terhadap Jason Brannan Buğra Kalkan* & Pınar Ebe Güzgü Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Izmir Katip Celebi University Address: Balatcik Mahallesi, No: 33/2, 35620 Cigli, Izmir, Turkey E-mail: bugra.kalkan@ikcu.edu.tr Article History: Received 05 August 2022; Accepted 30 December 2022; Published Online 13 February 2023 Abstract Jason Brennan, who proposes assessing democratic decisions based on non-procedural expert knowledge from a pure utilitarian standpoint, holds a prominent position among libertarian critiques of democracy. Brennan contends that epistocratic regimes can outperform democracies since democracies perform badly due to the phenomena of rational ignorance and deliberative democratic methods cannot solve this problem. Brennan, who compares epistocratic institutions to constitutional institutions, wants to tame democracies using negative externality arguments. In this study, we demonstrate that constitutional democracies cannot be assessed by the Brennanian metrics and that epistocracy will erode the libertarian political successes of constitutional democracy. Two important arguments back up this conclusion. First, transforming libertarian ideals beyond constitutional rules into the standard for daily politics allows experts tremendous discretion. Even with good intentions, the unchecked discretion of experts would most likely undermine the general, abstract, and egalitarian rules required by a complex society. Second, taking the concept of rational choice out of its original context will make the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional governments unclear. Therefore, the libertarian ideal of the limited government established by the separation of powers and the procedures of checks and balances would lose its signifcance, giving place to the unchecked discretion of expert rule. Keywords: constitutional democracy; epistocracy; libertarianism; procedural democracy; rule utilitarianism Abstrak Jason Brennan, yang mengusulkan penilaian keputusan demokratis berdasarkan pengetahuan ahli non-prosedural dari sudut pandang utilitarian murni, memegang posisi menonjol di antara kritik libertarian demokrasi. Brennan berpendapat bahwa rezim epistokrat dapat mengungguli demokrasi karena demokrasi berkinerja buruk disebabkan oleh fenomena ketidaktahuan rasional dan metode demokrasi deliberatif tidak dapat menyelesaikan masalah ini. Brennan, yang membandingkan lembaga epistokrat dengan lembaga konstitusional, ingin menjinakkan demokrasi dengan menggunakan argumen eksternalitas negatif. Dalam studi ini, kami menunjukkan bahwa demokrasi konstitusional tidak dapat dinilai dengan metrik Brennanian dan bahwa epistokrasi akan mengikis keberhasilan politik libertarian demokrasi konstitusional. Dua argumen penting mendukung kesimpulan ini. Pertama, mengubah cita-cita libertarian di luar aturan konstitusional menjadi standar kebijakan sehari-hari memungkinkan para ahli memiliki diskresi yang luar biasa. Bahkan dengan niat baik, kebijaksanaan para ahli yang tidak terkendali kemungkinan besar akan merusak aturan umum, abstrak, dan egaliter yang dibutuhkan oleh masyarakat yang kompleks. Kedua, mengeluarkan konsep pilihan rasional dari konteks aslinya akan membuat perbedaan antara pemerintahan konstitusional dan inkonstitusional menjadi tidak jelas. Oleh karena itu, cita-cita libertarian tentang pemerintahan terbatas yang dibentuk oleh pemisahan kekuasaan dan prosedur checks and balances akan kehilangan signifkansinya, memberi tempat pada diskresi yang tidak terkendali dari aturan ahli. Kata kunci: demokrasi konstitusional, epistokrasi, libertarianisme, demokrasi prosedural, utilitarianisme aturan Introduction In the past two decades, the libertarian/classical liberal tradition has witnessed the emergence of a novel form of democracy critique, centered on the concept of rational ignorance. The public choice theory argues that, in representative democracies, there is no rational reason for citizens to gain the knowledge necessary to make sound political judgments (Downs 1957, Buchanan & Tullock 1962). Although