.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. POLITICS SYMPOSIUM .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. Economic Pessimism and Political Punishment in 2020 Brad Lockerbie, East Carolina University .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. E lection forecasting is fraught with peril. How- ever, if instead of being like political pundits, we provide our model of election outcomes and the data, it is possible to assess the statistical accur- acy of our model and move beyond simple atheoretical correlations. We should strive to have a forecast with a long lead time. If an announcer predicts the winner of a football game with less than a minute to go, we care very little about the forecasts accuracy. If a forecast is made before the game begins and is just as accurate, we would be quite interested. Actors who are dependent on the outcome of the election can modify their strategy and behavior if the forecast is provided well before the election. 1 INFLUENCES ON ELECTION OUTCOMES Because there are many variables available, it would be impos- sible to include them all: we have to trim their number down. We can have some sense of election outcomes by looking at the state of the economy. The voting behavior literature is rich with economic models of voting behavior. Because there are so few cases, and because the retrospective and prospective items are so highly correlated (.86), I follow Fiorina (1981), Lewis- Beck (1988), Lewis-Beck and Whitten (2013), Lockerbie (2008; 2016), and Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger (2013), whose forecasts focus on economic expectations. As with the earlier models, I make use of the item from table 8 of the Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior. The score is the average of the responses in the negative for the second quarter of the election year to this question: Now looking aheaddo you think you (and your family living there) will be better off or worse off financially a year from now, or about the same? 2 Given that this item lacks attribution to the parties, it should only serve to understate the relationship between economics and the election outcome, because one could believe that ones financial situation will change regardless of the election. Moreover, one might think that the opposition party will win, which would improve ones economic condition. This model would take expectation to indicate support for the incumbent party. Again, this should serve to understate the relationship between prospective economic evaluations and electoral outcomes. 3 There are also some noneconomic patterns related to election outcomes. Abramowitz (2000) has noted the desire of the public to change parties in the White House after one party has controlled it for two terms. 4 An incumbent party returning for a third term without the same candidate running for reelection is a rarity in American politics. To account for the diminished support for the incumbent party, I make use of the log of time a party has controlled the presidency. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS Table 1 shows the presidential election model. 5 The results of this iteration are similar to those of earlier years. The more pessimistic people are, the more likely the incumbent party is defeated. The incumbent party loses slightly more than one- half percentage point of the vote for each percentage point increase in pessimism. As expected, there is a negative rela- tionship between the length of time a party has controlled the White House and its share of the vote. To assess the utility of this model, I use out-of-sample equations. 6 The average absolute error is 2.70 percentage points. The two independent variables are significant at the .01 level or better in every equation. The equation has success- fully predicted the outcome in every election, except in 1960 and 1968; Nixon was forecast to win in 1960 and lose in 1968. In 2000 and 2016, the equation did forecast the actual popular vote winner. For the Democrats, alas, the popular vote and the electoral vote majority were not in agreement. What does this say for 2020? Even with the atypical political climate resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and President Trumps rhetoric, I believe that the model will successfully forecast the outcome of the 2020 election. There is anxiety over the state of the economy, but the public is only modestly more pessimistic than usual. Over the period of the study, the mean level of pessimism is 11.64%. In 2020, the level of pessimism is 12%. Additionally, despite Donald Trumps tendency to raise hackles, the Republicans have had the White House for only four years. If the model is accurate, with these tenuous circumstances, its strength and precision will be evident. The forecast is a comfortable victory (more than 55% of the two-party vote) for the Republicans. Given that the standard error of the estimate is 2.92 and the forecast is that the Republicans win more than 55% of the vote, using the t-distribution, the estimated probability of the Republicans getting more than 50% of the vote is 95%. If one looks at the out-of-sample errors, there has only been one forecast error greater than 5.17 points. This translates to a .94 probability that the Republicans will win the popular vote. US HOUSE ELECTIONS RESULTS The same model, with one addition, can be used to forecast the seat change in the House of Representatives. The addition is the inclusion of a variable that accounts for incumbency; doi:10.1017/S1049096520001444 © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association PS 2020 1