Resolving Asymmetric Stalemate: the case of the Tibet Question BRANTLY WOMACK* A situation of asymmetric stalemate exists when neither side can force a unilateral resolution of a conflict even though one side is significantly stronger than the other. Although a standoff can persist indefinitely, the only path to resolution of conflict is negotiation. Even though the conflict between China and the Dalai Lama regarding Tibetan autonomy is not one between sovereign states, it fits the pattern of asymmetric stalemate. Current discussions between China and the Dalai Lama illustrate the importance of recognition of autonomy on the part of the stronger side and of deference on the part of the weaker side in resolving asymmetric stalemate. Irreconcilable differences often mark the end of marriages and of peace between nations. But in international relations permanent separation is often not feasible (the parties cannot move away from one another), and war can be inconclusive even when one side is much stronger than the other. In cases of stalemate, where neither side is able to resolve the conflict through coercion and neither benefits from continuing hostility, frustration can lead to negotiations. Since neither side can simply overcome the other, negotiations to end stalemate can only be successful if their object is the management of differences rather than their final solution. 1 Even though the parties are negotiating the end of stalemate from positions of hostility and mistrust, their mutual experience with the costs of conflict and the frustration of their war aims provides a common interest. In situations of asymmetric stalemate, the stronger side typically finds that it cannot achieve its limited aims with the resources that it is willing to commit, while the weaker side suffers more acutely but cannot surrender because its autonomy and identity are at risk. Successful negotiation of an asymmetric stalemate requires that the stronger side is not put at risk by the consequences of disengagement, and that the weaker side is assured that its basic autonomy is respected. Although such negotiations are rarely swift and easy, the frustration of hostility drives them on, and bitter experience of the futility of stalemate underwrites the stability of the ensuing normalization. * Brantly Womack is Professor of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. He has published extensively on Asian politics. His most recent book, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2006. Articles on asymmetric international relations have appeared in Journal of Strategic Studies, Pacific Affairs, and Journal of Contemporary China. 1. For a more extensive analysis of asymmetric stalemate, see Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 4. Journal of Contemporary China (2007), 16(52), August, 443–460 ISSN 1067-0564 print/ 1469-9400 online/07/520443–18 q 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/10670560701314255