Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 1996, Vol. 27, No. 5, 429^37 Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0735-7028/96/S3.00 Do You Believe in Repressed Memories? Jonathan M. Golding, Rebecca Policy Sanchez, and Sandra A. Sego University of Kentucky A survey of 613 undergraduates investigated beliefs about and experience with repressed memories. The results indicated that participants (a) had some degree of belief in repressed memories; (b) felt that therapy sometimes leads to false memories being implanted; (c) felt, to some degree, that re- pressed memory evidence should be allowed in court; and (d) had experience with repressed mem- ories, either personally or through media coverage. Also, the gender of the participants affected many of the ratings (e.g., women had greater belief in and more personal experience with such memories than men). The implications of these results for professionals and laypeople are discussed. During the past few years, there has been increased interest in repressed memories. Freud (1915/1957) stated that "the es- sence of repression lies simply in the function of rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness" (p. 105). Therefore, repression serves as a defense mechanism (Freud, 1894/ 1962a, 1896 /1962b) by which an individual defends himself or herself against the conscious recollection of a traumatic memory and its associated consequences. Despite being repressed, the mem- ory may still affect the individual at an unconscious level. More- over, the repressed memory may eventually reemerge intocon- sciousness (see Erdelyi, 1985). The renewed interest in repressed memories has led to a de- bate (sometimes quite heated) concerning the validity of such memories (see American Psychological Association, 1996). There are those individuals who believe that repressed memo- ries are fundamentally different from other memories. Among JONATHAN M. GOLDING received his PhD from the University of Den- ver in 1986. He is on the faculty in the Cognitive and Developmental Studies Program at the University of Kentucky. His research interests include children's eyewitness testimony, intentional forgetting, and question answering. REBECCA POLLEY SANCHEZ received her master's degree in experimen- tal psychology at the University of Kentucky in 1995 and is currently pursuing her doctorate in the same program. Her research interests are the development of memory and intentional forgetting. SANDRA A. SEGO is currently working toward her PhD in experimental psychology at the University of Kentucky, where she also received her master's degree in 1993. Her research interests include intentional for- getting and inhibition. WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK Claire Combs, Trisha Mulhall, Patricia Richardson, Liz Overton, and Robin Gooch for their assistance in col- lecting and scoring the data. We would also like to thank Gregory Smith and Donald Lynam for their comments on earlier versions of this article. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the University of Kentucky Re- search Center for including our questions about repressed memories in their Fall 1995 Kentucky Survey. Portions of this article were presented at the American Psychological Society Convention, New \brk, July 1995. CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to Jonathan M. Golding, Department of Psychology, University of Ken- tucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0044. E-mail may be sent via the Internet to psy228@pop.uky.edu. these individuals are psychodynamically oriented therapists, which, of course, makes sense because the construct of repres- sion is the foundation on which most of psychoanalysis rests (Loftus, 1993). To bolster their claims, these individuals cite numerous clinical anecdotes for repression (e.g., Rieker & Car- men, 1986; M. Williams, 1987) in which individuals, during the course of therapy, recall (i.e., recover) memories that had been lost for many years. In addition, some types of empirical studies have been used to support the reality of repression (see Erdelyi, 1985, and Erdelyi & Goldberg, 1979, for reviews of this research). These studies include research on hyperamnesia (e.g., Erdelyi & Kleinbard, 1978), retrieval inhibition (e.g., Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman, 1983), and autobiographical memories (Davis, 1987; Davis & Schwartz, 1987; L. M. Wil- liams, 1994). There are also those who question the fundamentally differ- ent nature of repressed memories. These skeptics argue that the anecdotal reports of repressed memories are "empirical obser- vations lacking in scientific underpinnings" (Ganaway, 1992, p. 203; see also Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1996). In addition, it is argued that, despite the claims of the believers, no controlled laboratory studies support the psychological reality of repres- sion (Holmes, 1990; Loftus, 1993). It should be noted that these skeptics do not deny the existence of repressed memories, but as Loftus (1993) stated, "We do not yet have the tools for reliably distinguishing the signal of true repressed memories from the noise of false ones" (p. 534). Although much of the debate is being played out in academic and professional arenas, the issue of the validity of repressed memories is also important to the public at large. The repressed memory debate has forged its way into the public sector in two ways. First, the public appears to be fascinated by the issue. It is reasonable to assume that most people have been exposed to a story dealing with repressed memories in the newspaper or on television. Loftus (1993) cited many of these examples, includ- ing the well-publicized cases of the entertainer Roseanne and former Miss America Marilyn Van Derbur. Second, the courts have had to face the issue of repressed memories. A number of the instances described in the media concerning the recovery of a repressed memory include civil or criminal charges being brought to court on the basis of the memory (see Loftus & Ket- chum, 1994; Terr, 1994). 429 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.