Christian Helmut Wenzel Kant and Quantum Physics on Freedom and Determinism In this paper, I do three things� First, I sketch Kant’s account and solution of the antinomy of freedom and determinism; then I confront his ideas with views from quantum physics and ideas from Laplace; and fnally, I present a sketch of an alternative solution of my own� I do not discuss Kant’s theory of freedom as based on apperception, synthesis, the categories, and other aspects of ‘sponta- neity’ of the understanding� I do not discuss the Analogies of Experience� Nor do I discuss Kant’s theory of morality and practical freedom� Instead, I restrict myself to the third Antinomy and Kant’s attempt to avoid a contradiction between freedom and determinism� I will introduce three independent ideas to confront the Antinomy and Kant’s ‘solution:’ Quantum physics, Laplace’s demon, and the idea of a remainder within space and time that I suggest as part of an alternative to ‘noumenal causation’ and the ‘thing in itself’� 1. Te Tird Antinomy and Kant’s ‘Solution’ Kant presents the third Antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason in the form of a thesis and an antithesis� Te thesis (F) claims that there is freedom, that is, freedom of spontaneity, causality of freedom, the ability to set a beginning in time and space that is not determined by what happened before� Te antithesis (D) claims that there is no such freedom, but only natural mechanical causality, that is, determinism from the past and the laws of nature� Both sides argue by pointing out mistakes in the opponent’s position� Tus, the defender of the thesis (F) argues that natural causality is incomplete� If each event merely had a pre- ceding cause in time and space, there could never be a complete explanation of any event� An infnite regress would arise� In opposition to this, the defender of the antithesis (D) argues that freedom of spontaneity would upset the coherence and homogeneity of natural laws and natural causality� Kant then points out mistakes in the arguments on both sides� Te defender of the thesis (F) makes the mistaken assumption that a complete spatio-temporal explanation of an event would be necessary� Kant agrees that every event has a cause in the past, but even though an infnite series arises, such a series is merely demanded (aufgegeben) and need not actually be given (gegeben; Critique of Pure In: Benedikt Paul Göcke and Ralph Stefan Weir (eds.), From Existentialism to Metaphysics: The Philosophy of Stephen Priest, Peter Lang 2021, pp. 163-170.