1 Forthcoming in Kevin Cahill ed. Wittgenstein and Practice: Back to the Rough Ground, Palgrave-Macmillan. Kripke and Wittgenstein on rule-following: the problem of empty philosophical explanations Oskari Kuusela This chapter discusses the question, what kind of explanation is given when rule-following is characterized as a practice or as involving or based on communal agreement, and how Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following should be understood in light of his philosophical methodology. I argue that certain kind of explanations, often attributed to Wittgenstein and discussed in this essay with reference to Kripke, that treat communal agreement as a condition of possibility and a ground of rule-following, are problematic. Such explanations are not consistent with Wittgenstein’s philosophical methodology, and closer inspection reveals them to be empty pseudo-explanations that cannot do the intended philosophical work. Thus, as I argue, Kripke’s account merely pushes the problem about rules one step further, where it arises again as a problem about understanding communal agreement. Instead the characterization of rule-following as a practice is better construed as clarificatory description that ascribes a role to linguistic practices and communal agreement as the background or context against which instances of rule-following, having certain intentions and understanding meanings are possible. 1. Wittgenstein’s method