REVIEW ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp. xvii + 251, £47.00 (hardback) ISBN-10: 0521130093 ISBN-13: 978-0521130097 Sungho Choi Philosophy Dept., Kyung Hee University Seoul, Republic of Korea choise80@khu.ac.kr Scientific realism has been at the heart of contemporary philosophical discus- sions regarding the intellectual enterprises collectively called ‘science’. Very approximately, it is the view that we are entitled to accept our best scientific theories at face value, as providing a literally true description of reality, ob- servable or not. Though this view may seem commonsensical at first glance, it has invited numerous powerful criticisms from skeptics with the result that there is a growing agreement among philosophers that it now requires con- siderable refinements and careful metaphysical backing. The thought is that scientific realism must be considerably refined such that what is susceptible to realist commitment is carefully circumscribed; and, further, that it is in need of metaphysical support that involves suitable clarifications of metaphysical no- tions like causation, properties, laws of nature, kinds, and so on, which sci- entific realists often make recourse to in their defense. This is a tremendous task, which is squarely tackled by Anjan Chakravartty’s A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. The book, whose goal is to supply the requisite metaphysical machinery for scientific realists and thereby tell us how to be a sophisticated scientific realist, divides into three carefully coordinated parts. The first part is devoted to the issue of developing semirealism, Chakravartty’s own brand of realism, by bringing together what he thinks are the best insights of entity realism and structural realism. He holds that scientific realism has been beset with a variety of challenges, one of which is the pessimistic induction on the history of Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 62 (2011), 443–451 ß The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com doi:10.1093/bjps/axq038 Advance Access published on February 25, 2011 at University of Notre Dame on August 24, 2016 http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from