Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Marine Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol Factors contributing to technical efficiency in a mixed fishery: Implications in buyback programs Daniel Quijano a, ⁎ , Silvia Salas a , Carmen Monroy-García b , Iván Velázquez-Abunader a a CINVESTAV-IPN, Antigua Carretera a Progreso Km. 6, C.P. 97310 Mérida, Yucatán, Mexico b CRIPY-INAPESCA, Carretera a Chelem Blvd. del pescador s/n Puerto de Abrigo, C.P. 97320 Yucalpetén, Yucatán, Mexico ARTICLE INFO Keywords: Mixed fleet Technical efficiency Fishing effort Buyback programs ABSTRACT Understanding the factors that define technical efficiency in a fishing fleet is a requirement for the im- plementation of management strategies, such as buybacks. The goal of this study was to evaluate the efficiency of a semi-industrial fleet operating in the Bank of Campeche, Mexico. The reduction in the catches of main target species necessitates the implementation of management alternatives to reduce the current fishing pressure. A stochastic frontier analysis model was used to evaluate the efficiency and the factors that influence efficiency of four fleet segments defined by fishing gear. Five variables were included: days at sea, crew size, engine power, month and year. Data was retrieved from logbooks that had recorded details of a total of 5497 fishing trips that had taken place during the seasons of 2005, 2012 and 2014. Interviews were also conducted in the Yucatan coast to explore the skippers’ perspectives on the factors that influence fleet efficiency. The results were different between fleet segments, both in estimated efficiencies as significant variables. The difficulty of establishing global targets of fishing effort reduction, through buybacks, for a mixed fleet, with different gears, different target species and different performance is discussed. 1. Introduction The overcapacity of fishing fleets is a phenomenon that has been spreading all over the world [1], and although this problem and its economic and social implications are recognized [2], the debate re- garding how to control the factors that contribute to the overcapacity of the fleets continues to date. FAO [3] defines fishing capacity as the quantity of catch produced within a period by a vessel or fleet, with the optimum use of inputs and the stock conditions. Such capacity has regularly been measured in terms of number of vessels, number of li- censes, gross register tonnage (GRT) or power of vessel engines. How- ever, the fishing operations of a fleet can vary depending on other factors (number of days at sea, number of hauls or hooks, size of the crew, etc.) [4]. Quimbar-Acosta [5] indicates that there are signs of overcapitalization of fisheries when a marginal unit of increase in the effort causes the reduction in individual productivity of the vessels, even when the global production is stable. Hence, overcapacity results in an underuse of inputs (capital, labor) in order to efficiently produce the levels of capture observed [6]. Amongst the conditions that are considered to contribute to the overcapacity of a fleet there exist: a lack of mechanisms to regulate fishing effort, an absence of property rights, open access systems and management strategies that incite overcapitalization, such as subsides [6]. Given the absence of regulation mechanisms, fishermen invest in their vessels and increase their efforts in order to increase the quantity of catch. The additional effort is often profitable in the short term, but it can have a negative impact in the long term depending on the condi- tions of the exploited stock and the number of operating units [7]. The increase in this phenomenon and the decline of diverse fishing stocks worldwide require a constant revision of the management system in order to put forward congruent adaptations to these changes. Adapta- tions related to the control of the fishing effort, such as the retirement of the vessel program and the sale of license for gear and resources, have become a great importance to many countries of Europe, Aus- tralia, and North America [8], however the goals have not always been achieved and in some cases the programs have resulted in controversy due to the lack of an evaluation of fleet efficiency before and after the implementation of these programs [9]. This study presents some examples of buyback programs and dis- cusses the advantages of the programs within different contexts. Subsequently, the characteristics of the Campeche Bank fishery are used to describe the overcapitalization problem of a fleet, where the possi- bility of introducing a buyback program has been explored by local authorities and the fishing industry, due to the decreasing capture of https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.05.004 Received 19 May 2017; Received in revised form 23 March 2018; Accepted 3 May 2018 ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: daniel.quijano@cinvestav.mx (D. Quijano). Marine Policy 94 (2018) 61–70 0308-597X/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. T