Friendly Theism (In James Kraft, ed., Religious Tolerance through Epistemic Humility (Ashgate, 2008)) John Greco Saint Louis University 12-14-06 In a now classic paper, William Rowe defends a position he calls “friendly atheism.” i Having presented what he takes to be a compelling argument against the existence of God, Rowe raises the question whether an atheist who accepts the argument must thereby consider theistic belief to be irrational. Here is Rowe: It is not difficult for an atheist to be friendly when he has reason to believe that the theist could not reasonably be expected to be acquainted with the grounds for disbelief that he (the atheist) possesses. For then the atheist may take the view that some theists are rationally justified in holding to theism, but would not be so were they to be acquainted with the grounds for disbelief—those grounds being sufficient to tip the scale in favor of atheism when balanced against the reasons the theist has in support of his belief. Friendly atheism becomes paradoxical, however, when the atheist contemplates believing that the theist has all the grounds for atheism that he, the atheist, has, and yet is rationally justified in maintaining his theistic belief. But even so excessively friendly a view as this perhaps can be held by the atheist if he also has some