SYMPOSIUM Feelings in Guts and Bones: Reply to Lewis, Magnus, and Strevens Anjan Chakravartty: Scientific ontology: integrating naturalized metaphysics and voluntarist epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 296pp, US$74.00 HB Anjan Chakravartty 1 Published online: 9 July 2018 Ó Springer Nature B.V. 2018 In Scientific Ontology, I attempt to describe the nature of our investigations into what there is and associated theorizing in a way that respects the massive contributions of the sciences to this endeavor, and yet does not shy away from the fact that the endeavor itself is inescapably permeated by philosophical commit- ments. While my interest is first and foremost in what we can learn from the sciences about ontology, it quickly extends to issues that go well beyond scientific practices themselves, for two reasons. For one thing, it is not merely the case that philosophical considerations are relevant to ontological judgments even in the sciences; additionally, there are good philosophical reasons to believe that different assessments of these considerations are rationally permissible, which entails that rational agents may well come to different conclusions about scientific ontology in ways that admit of no ultimate resolution, in principle. Secondly, given this defensible variability of assessment, we have good reason to regard some disputes about whether particular patches of ontological theorizing deserve the label ‘‘scientific,’’ as opposed to ‘‘non-’’ or ‘‘un-scientific,’’ as ultimately irresolvable as well. All of this may be controversial, but I take it to be a true description of our precariously human epistemic condition in the realm of ontology. In the following, I discuss some rich, penetrating thoughts about these ideas by Peter Lewis, P.D. Magnus, and Michael Strevens. Given their unwitting but nonetheless commendable decency in engaging with largely separate issues, I will discuss their challenges in sequence, in a direction of increasing skepticism. Lewis lends a sympathetic ear to much of the account, but feels that something very important—an appropriately deflationary approach to ontology, as may best fit one of the major case studies of the book—has been left out. Magnus likewise feels that & Anjan Chakravartty chakravartty@miami.edu 1 Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA 123 Metascience (2018) 27:379–387 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-018-0341-z