1 The Nature of War Nikos Psarros. Leipzig I. Introduc6on The tradi6onal defini6on of war given by Hugo Gro6us 1 and other classical authors is, that war is a violent conflict between sovereigns. This means that war cannot be outlawed by any higher authority, since the sovereign is the uppermost authority upon the lives of the persons that are subject to them. Only the sovereign has the right and the power to forbid the violent resolu6on of conflicts among their subjects and as sovereign they are not subject to any higher worldly power, but only to the power of God. The obliga6ons to God are for the most classical authors not of legal nature 2 but cons6tute the realm of morality. Thus, the main ques6on for the classical authors on war theory is the clarifica6on of the moral condi6ons that jus6fy a sovereign to wage war against another sovereign, the so-called theory of just war. Since the classical authors subordinate the concept of war under the concept of jus6ce the theory of just war includes reflec6ons about the proper means of conduc6ng a war from the point of view of jus6ce. In other words, the theory of just war also formulates criteria for such acts that are considered as war crimes. In this essay I will not challenge the theory of just war itself, but the tradi6onal defini6on of war in terms of exer6on of legi6mate violence. My alterna6ve defini6on defini6on will be given in the third sec6on of the essay and relies on the Platonic concept of peace, and on the Aristotelian concepts of priva4on and analogy. I think that violence is not a cons6tu6ve characteris6c of war, but the conceptual, i.e., logical consequence of its defini6on. In other words, the state of war can be declared and persist without any acts of violence. The use of violence is jus6fied by the manifesta6on of the state of war. In this essay I will not concern myself with the concrete moral aspects of war. These has been discussed extensively by classical and contemporary authors with respect to the various kinds of real conflicts that resort to acts of violence that are regarded as acts of war. 3 I will give only a non-theis6c or deis6c account of the moral aspect that is based on the fact that acts of war are the result of judgments. II. Modes of Defini6on A concept can be defined by lis6ng the features that characterise the objects or the situa6ons that are referred to by it, or by lis6ng its cons6tu6ve parts. Thus, for example, the concept of ‘Scandinavia’ can be defined by lis6ng the states that are commonly subsumed under this common name: Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark – and some6mes Finland. The concept of ‘water’ on the other hand, can be defined by lis6ng the characteris6c proper6es of this 1 Hugo Gro)us, The Rights of War and Peace (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 240. Gro)us regards as sovereigns not only states, or kings, but also private persons that exist outside any state authority. Since in present )mes there is no place on Earth that is not subject to state authority, present )me wars are waged solely between states. 2 With the excep)on of Hobbes and perhaps of Spinoza in his interpreta)on of the rela)onship between the biblical Hebrews and God. 3 For the contemporary discussion cf. Jovan Babic, “Ethics of War and Ethics in War”, in Conatus 4, no. 1 (2019): 9-30, Georg Meggle, Terror & Der Krieg gegen ihn. Öffentliche Reflexionen (Paderborn: Men)s, 2003, and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical IllustraHons (New York: Basic Books, 1977).