Supply Chain Network Competition in Time-Sensitive Markets Anna Nagurney 1,2 , Min Yu 3 , Jonas Floden 2 , and Ladimer S. Nagurney 4 1 Department of Operations and Information Management Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 2 School of Business, Economics and Law University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden 3 Pamplin School of Business Administration University of Portland Portland, Oregon 97203 4 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Hartford, West Hartford, Connecticut 06117 March 2014; revised May 2014 Transportation Research E 70, (2014), pp 112-127 Abstract: We develop a game theory model for supply chain network competition in time- sensitive markets in which consumers respond to the average delivery time associated with the various firms’ products. The firms’ behavior is captured, along with the supply chain network topologies, with the governing equilibrium concept being that of Nash equilibrium. We derive the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions and provide illustrative examples. We also identify special cases for distinct applications. An algorithm is proposed, and the framework further illustrated through a case study in which we explore varying sensitivities to the average time delivery with interesting results. Keywords: supply chains, logistics, networks, time-based competition, game theory, freight services, delay tolerant networks, information asymmetry, variational inequalities 1