A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia ERIN JENNE Central European University This article develops a general theory of bargaining between a minority, its host state, and outside lobby actor to explain why minorities shift their demands from affirmative action to cultural autonomy to seces- sionism and back, often in the absence of clear economic or security incentives. This paper uses a simple game tree model to show that if a minority believes that it enjoys significant support from a powerful na- tional homeland or other external actor, it radicalized its demands against the host state, even if the center has credibly committed to protect minority rights. Conversely, if a minority believes that it enjoys no external support, then it will accommodate the host state, even in the presence of significant majority repression. As a general theory of claim-making, this model challenges structural theories of demands that rely on static eco- nomic differences or historical grievances to explain claim-making. It also challenges security dilemma arguments that hold that minority radicalization is mainly a function of ethnic fears. The model’s hypoth- eses are tested using longitudinal analysis of Hungarians in Vojvodina during the 1990s, as the Yugoslav dog that ‘‘barked but did not bite.’’ Careful examination of claim-making in this case demonstrates the su- perior explanatory power of the ethnic bargaining model as compared with dominant theories of minority mobilization in the literature. Recent trends in violent conflict demonstrate the need for a general theory of group claim-making. 1 Over the last decade, only eight of 110 armed conflicts were fought between states; most of the remaining wars were waged between minorities and their state governments over claims of self-determination (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2000). From the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the Sri Lankan Tamils in the Indian Ocean; from the Chechen separatists in Russia to the Taiwanese facing off against China; from the Kashmiris sandwiched between two belligerent South Asian states to the Albanian Kosovars in Yugoslavia; from the newly independent East Timor to the periodically secessionist Acehnese in Indo- nesia, resistance movements routinely use terrorism and guerilla warfare to achieve Author’s note: I am grateful to colleagues at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper. I would also like to thank Barry Weingast, David Primo, and Barry O’Neill who helped me refine the model in an earlier stage of development; thanks are also due to Patrick James and three anonymous reviewers at ISQ for useful substantive and presentational criticism. 1 Group ‘‘demands’’ or ‘‘claims’’ are defined here as calls made (a) by legitimate representatives of an ethnically defined community (b) against the state or local government (c) for goods that may be collectively enjoyed by the community. r 2004 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 729–754 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/48/4/729/1816450 by guest on 27 August 2023