1 Silence and Contradiction in the Jaina Saptabhaṅgī Draft Version Forthcoming in Journal of Indian Philosophy Chris Rahlwes Abstract The Jaina saptabhaṅgī (seven angles of analysis or types of sentences) has drawn the attention of non-classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and avaktavya (‘unutterable’). In its most basic structure, the saptabhaṅgī appears as: (i) in a certain sense, P; (ii) in a certain sense, not P; (iii) in a certain sense, P and not P; (iv) in a certain sense, inexpressibility of P; (v) in a certain sense, P and inexpressibility of P; (vi) in a certain sense, not P and inexpressibility of P; (vii) in a certain sense, P, not P, and inexpressibility of P. This appearance has led many (e.g., Ganeri and Priest) to claim that the saptabhaṅgī supports non-classical systems of logic, but such a reading is contested by Balcerowicz. Focusing on Vādidevasūri’s (12 th c. CE) and Yaśovijaya’s (17 th c. CE) accounts of the saptabhaṅgī, this paper puts forward a formalization of the saptabhaṅgī that brings together the non-classical views and Balcerowicz’s view through relating the saptabhaṅgī to the Buddhist unanswerable questions. Keywords Negation, Contradiction, Saptabhaṅgī, Jainism, The Unanswerable Questions 0. Introduction The Jaina saptabhaṅgī (seven bhaṅgas (types of sentences or angles of analysis)) has drawn the attention of non- classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and avaktavya (‘ineffable’, ‘unutterable’, or ‘should not be said’). In its most basic structure, the saptabhaṅgī appears as: (i) in a certain sense, P; (ii) in a certain sense, not P; (iii) in a certain sense, P and not P; (iv) in a certain sense, the inexpressibility of P; (v) in a certain sense, P and the inexpressibility of P; (vi) in a certain sense, not P and inexpressibility of P; (vii) in a certain sense, P, not P, and the inexpressibility of P. In taking P as a proposition, these bhaṅgas have striking similarities to Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 (as noted by Ganeri (2002)) as well as Weak Kleene logic K3 (as noted by Priest (2008)) and the Logic of Paradox LP (as noted by Matilal (2000) and Priest (2008)). 1 These similarities arise when one considers the first bhaṅga as relating to the truth-value of true, the second as relating to false, and the fourth as relating to either a truth-value gap (neither true nor false) or a truth-value glut (both true and false). Balcerowicz (2015, pp. 184–195) has convincingly contested this reading. He argues that the Jaina saptabhaṅgī should not be understood as representing truth-values. Rather, it is only when all seven bhaṅgas are taken together does one have true statement. Even so, 1 K3 and LP attribute an additional truth-value (either a truth-value gap or a truth-value glut) to the more common true and false. K3 is characterized by a truth-value gap (see Kleene (1938) and Priest (2002, pp.122–124)). LP is structurally similar to K3 but is characterized by a truth-value glut (see Priest (1979) and Priest (2008, pp. 124–125). D2 is a modal logic based on the modal system S5 (see Jaśkowski (1969) and Ganeri (2002, pp. 275–276)). D2 differs from K3 and LP since neither is inherently modal.