Journal of Business Research 149 (2022) 85–100 0148-2963/© 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Asset specifcity asymmetry and supplier opportunism in buyer–supplier exchanges ☆ Fabrice Lumineau a , Jason Lu Jin b, * , Shibin Sheng c , Kevin Zheng Zhou d a Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong b The City University of Hong Kong Dongguan Research Institute, Dongguan, China c Collat School of Business, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL 35294, USA d Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong A R T I C L E INFO Keywords: Asset specifcity asymmetry Opportunism Supply market uncertainty Prior exchange history ABSTRACT Despite the prominent role of asset specifcity in buyer–supplier exchanges, its infuence on opportunism remains controversial. While transaction cost economics (TCE) addresses its potential to encourage opportunism, rela- tional exchange theory (RET) highlights its role in discouraging opportunism. We extend this debate by considering (1) the effects of asset specifcity asymmetry, (2) changes in supplier opportunism over time, and (3) the moderating roles of supply market uncertainty and prior exchange history. We argue that the logics of TCE and RET are not fundamentally irreconcilable; instead, we suggest a perspective combining the calculative logic of TCE within the relationship logic of RET such that they jointly affect opportunism changes. Our propositions are supported by the results of a matched sample of 193 buyer–supplier relationships at two time points. 1. Introduction Given that asset specifcity (AS) facilitates the effciency of an ex- change relationship, it is a central concept in the study of interorgani- zational relationships and strategic alliances (Wang, Jiang, Li, Motohashi, & Zheng, 2019; see De Vita, Tekaya, & Wang, 2011; Del- bufalo, 2021 for recent reviews). However, theoretical and empirical debates exist over how AS infuences opportunism. Relational exchange theory (RET) argues that by signaling the desire to invest in an enduring relationship, AS discourages partner opportunism (Macneil, 1980). For example, Bensaou and Anderson (1999) found that credible commit- ments signaled by the buyer’s AS discourage supplier opportunism. This counterpoint is refected in the case of Japanese keiretsu. As observed by Dyer (1996), human asset cospecialization in Japanese automotive value chains results in superior information sharing and signals a cred- ible commitment. In contrast, transaction cost economics (TCE) scholars have high- lighted the potential liabilities associated with AS. Because a specifc asset cannot be easily redeployed to other relationships, it creates a lock- in effect for investors and enables receivers to exploit investments, thus increasing receivers’ opportunism (Penney & Combs, 2020; Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 2003; Williamson, 1985). An example is a chassis supplier holding up Ford in the U.K. The chassis was specifc to Ford’s Land Rover Discovery model. The supplier had gone bankrupt and had been taken over by a court-appointed receiver who insisted on a price for the chassis that was multiple times the original contracted price. Empirically, prior studies tend to use either RET or TCE to explain the effect of AS on opportunism, leading to inconsistent fndings (e.g., Handley & Benton, 2012; Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Rokkan et al., 2003; Wang, Li, Ross, & Craighead, 2013). As a result, it is not clear how AS affects partner opportunism in interorganizational relationships. This is an issue of great importance because opportunism is widely noted as a central risk in these relationships (Lumineau & Oliveira, 2020; Luo, Liu, Yang, Maksimov, & Hou, 2015; Zhou & Xu, 2012). We suggest instead that we are likely to gain a better understanding of the impact of AS on partner opportunism in interorganizational relationships by combining these two approaches. We aim to tackle this theoretical puzzle by overcoming important limitations in the extant literature. First, previous researchers have largely examined AS unilaterally (i.e., by focusing only on one frm; e.g., Luo, Liu, & Xue, 2009; Wang et al., 2019; Zhou & Poppo, 2010), over- looking the dyadic nature of AS (Cuypers, Hennart, Silverman, & Ertug, ☆ This study was supported by the General Research Fund from the Research Grants Council, Hong Kong SAR Government (Project No. HKU 17502420). Jason Lu Jin acknowledges the support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72002156). * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: lumineau@hku.hk (F. Lumineau), jinlu2014@gmail.com (J.L. Jin), ssheng@uab.edu (S. Sheng), kevinz@hku.hk (K.Z. Zhou). Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Business Research journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.011 Received 21 October 2021; Received in revised form 2 May 2022; Accepted 7 May 2022