Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research 8 (1): 72-76, 2011 ISSN 1990-9233 © IDOSI Publications, 2011 Corresponding Author: Mahdi Salehi, Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Takestan Branch, Iran. Tel: +98-9121425323. 72 A Study of the Relationship Between Institutional Investors and Corporate Value: Empirical Evidence of Iran Mahdi Salehi, Mohmoud Hematfar and Amin Heydari 1 2 3 Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Takestan Branch, Iran 1 Islamic Azad University, Boroujerd Branch, Iran 2 Member of Young Researchers Club, Doroud Branch, Iran 3 Abstract: Institutional investors have substantially grown globally, matured markets in last two decades parallel with the increase in their impact. They seek to own large proportions of equities; as a result they have become influential on the performance of companies in which they invest. The aim of the present study is to create the instances which are related to the controlling role of the institutional investors in listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange during 2001-2008. The results show that the growth and institutional investors’ level variables are the most important factors which have the positive effect on the corporate value. On other hand, the institutional investors’ concentration, debt and size variables are the most important factors, which have the negative effect on the corporate value. There is a meaningful negative relationship between the institutional investors’ concentration and corporate value, i.e. the institutional investors’ concentration decrease the company’s value. Key words: Institutional investors Institutional investors’ concentration Companies’ value INTRODUCTION The efficient monitoring hypothesis contends that Institutional investors have emerged as an integral the more efficient the monitoring exerted by that force in the equity market and they are pushing shareholder and the higher the likelihood of dissident companies to take long-term decisions that account for success. On the other hand the strategic alignment and the welfare of communities- corporate social responsibility conflict of- interest hypotheses state that large in the broader sense where they operate [1]. One potential institutional shareholders maintain strategic alliances with motivation is that institutional investors are interested in the incumbent management and will be swayed in their the long-term cash flows of their investments which are voting behaviour by their existing relationship with the increasingly linked to good corporate performance [2]. management, implying a lower likelihood of dissident Institutional investors can be defined as economic entities success in proxy contests. Hence the first hypothesis with large amount of capital to invest; they include mutual (efficient monitoring) predicts a positive relation whereas funds, brokerages, insurance companies, pension funds, the remaining two hypotheses (conflict-of-interest and investment banks and endowment funds [3]. Their strategic alignment) predict a negative relation between potential influence as large shareholders was traced back corporate value and institutional shareholding. Thus, the to 1930 in the separation of owners from control of few studies that exist provide mixed evidence on the effect business to be in the hand of directors when was first of institutional shareholding on the value of the firm. introduced by [4]. This separation of ownership was It is possible that institutional investors (similar to behind the agency problem, when managers (agents) corporate insiders) will decrease firm value once their might look for their own interest rather than on behalf the shareholdings exceed a certain level. That is, active interest of shareholders. The traditional view that the monitoring may improve firm value (convergence-of- distribution of a firm’s share ownership has no influence interest hypothesis) only up to a certain level of on the value of the firm has been challenged by a view shareholding. At higher levels of share ownership, that can be traced back to Berle and Means [4]. institutional institutions may encourage sub-optimal the larger the shareholding of the institutional shareholder