1 Mateusz Kolaszyński Jagiellonian University, Kraków mateusz.kolaszynski@uj.edu.pl ORCID: 0000-0002-9474-1779 Dariusz Stolicki Jagiellonian University, Kraków dariusz.stolicki@uj.edu.pl ORCID: 0000-0002-8295-0848 Regulatory capture of intelligence oversight committees: a new method applied to the Polish case 1 Abstract Parliamentary intelligence oversight committees are one of the classic forms of intelligence oversight, yet they are frequently regarded as inadequate. Many reasons have been proposed, such as a claim that legislators neglect oversight because of lack of sustained electoral pressure, or that political alignment between the executive and the legislative majority dampens the oversight zeal. We propose yet another hypothesis – one of regulatory capture. Oversight committee members, drawn into the secret world of intelligence and dealing regularly with its concerns, adopt the perspective of the entities they are supposed to oversee. We propose to test that hypothesis by analyzing parliamentary debates and roll call voting patterns. We expect oversight committee members to exhibit patterns differing from their similarly situated legislative colleagues – and we expect the magnitude of that effect to increase for new committee members as they gain experience. To cope with the volume of the material to be analyzed, we will use machine learning methods such as Natural Language Processing (vocabulary analysis, alignment-based clustering, sentiment analysis) and dimensionality reduction (PCA, SVM). In the present paper, we focus on the Polish case as a proof of concept, although the method described can be applied to any country. Introduction Intelligence oversight and accountability is one of the checks and balances of the democratic state framework. The execution of oversight is essential to the seamless functioning of the democratic system. The nature of intelligence operations, most notably their confidentiality, poses the following dilemma for democratic states: Is it possible to organize effective intelligence services without eroding democratic principles, processes, and institutions (Ott 2003: 71)? On one hand, intelligence services may jeopardize the democratic system. On the other, they are instrumental in neutralizing threats to the national security of democratic states (Krieger 2017: 226). Seeking a balance between the principles of constitutional democracy and the reality of intelligence work is often depicted as the democratization of intelligence services. For such democratization to happen, two requirements 1 This research was funded by the Priority Research Area Digiworld under the program Excellence Initiative – Research University at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4428355