Journal of Cosmology, 2011, Vol. 14. JournalofCosmology.com , 2011 Cosmological Implications of Near-Death Experiences Bruce Greyson University of Virginia, University of Virginia Health System, 210 10th Street, NE, Suite 100, Charlottesville, VA 22902-4754 Abstract "Near-death experiences" include phenomena that challenge materialist reductionism, such as enhanced mentation and memory during cerebral impairment, accurate perceptions from a perspective outside the body, and reported visions of deceased persons, including those not previously known to be deceased. Complex consciousness, including cognition, perception, and memory, under conditions such as cardiac arrest and general anesthesia, when it cannot be associated with normal brain function, requires a revised cosmology anchored not in 19th-century classical physics but rather in 21st-century quantum physics that includes consciousness in its conceptual formulation. Classical physics, anchored in materialist reductionism, offered adequate descriptions of everyday mechanics but ultimately proved insufficient for describing the mechanics of extremely high speeds or small sizes, and was supplemented a century ago by quantum physics. Materialist psychology, modeled on the reductionism of classical physics, likewise offered adequate descriptions of everyday mental functioning but ultimately proved insufficient for describing mentation under extreme conditions, such as the continuation of mental function when the brain is inactive or impaired, such as occurs near death. KEY WORDS: materialism, reductionism, near-death experience, mind-body problem, consciousness 1. Introduction to Near-death Experiences Many but not all neuroscientists, physicists, and psychologists believe the mind and consciousness are produced by, or are subjective concomitants of, brain states (Crick, 1994; Damasio & Meyer, 2009; Searle, 2000). This theory receives considerable support from the correlation between brain changes and mental changes: inhibiting brain activity generally inhibits mental activity (Churchland, 1986; Jeeves & Brown, 2009; Tononi & Laurys, 2009). However, correlation is not the same as causation. For example, it is well established that the frontal lobes control or mediate perceptual and other cognitive activities through inhibition (Joseph 1988, 1999a). It is in this manner that concentration and attention may be maintained, so that the mind remains focused. On the other hand, it is also well established that injuries to specific regions of the brain disrupt various aspects of consciousness and mental activity, including thinking, speech, and awareness of the body image (Joseph 1986, 1996, 1999b). Thus the production model posits that the brain generates the mind (Churchland, 1986; Crick, 1994; Searle, 2000), whereas the filter or transmission model posits that the brain may permit or mediate the mind (Broad, 1953; Burt, 1968; Huxley, 1954; James, 1898; Kelly, 2007; Schiller, 1891). By contrast, the evidence compiled by Joseph (1996, 1999b, 2001) could be said to support both views. Likewise, it is the opinion of this author that the