Husserl’s philosophical estrangement from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate Andrea Cimino 1 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020 Abstract Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a ‘phenomenology of sense- deception. ’ On the other hand, it has generated contrasting—if not utterly incompatible—readings of Husserl’s own account of sense perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl’s reflection on sensory perception, and highlights the philosophical limits and structural deficiencies of the current debate in light of some of Husserl’s insights. The analysis first provides a synopsis of the argumentative structures, aims, and assumptions informing the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. This assessment is then critically elaborated through the lens of Husserlian phenome- nology in its historical and theoretical distance from the recent debate. Contrary to certain readings of Husserl, the reconstruction of some cardinal phenomenological themes provides all the elements necessary to dislocate his own account from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism dispute, by means of both a ‘global’ and a ‘local’ analysis, and both exegetically and theoretically. Most importantly, a ‘return’ to Husserl shows the philosophical untenability of the whole controversy as not only leaving untouched the core problem of perception but also altering some of its essential traits. This critique of the image of experience portrayed in the contemporary discussion is conducted through a phenomenological clarification of perception as a distinct ‘structure of rules’ of consciousness and, more specifically, by means of a descriptive analysis centered on the core notion of horizonal-intentionality. Keywords Husserl . Conjunctivism . Disjunctivism . Illusion . Hallucination . Phenomenology https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09683-1 * Andrea Cimino andrea.cimino@kuleuven.be 1 Husserl-Archives: Center for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy, KU Leuven - Higher Institute of Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2 / box 3200, room: 02.02, 3000 Leuven, Belgium Published online: 28 July 2020 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2021) 20:743–779