The Closeness Problem for Double Effect: A Reply to Nelkin and Rickless Joshua Stuchlik 1 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 The best-known principle connecting intention and moral permissibility is the Principle of Double Effect (PDE). On its absolutist formulation the PDE says in part that it is always impermissible to execute the intention to kill or bring about serious harm to the innocent, though it may sometimes be permissible to intentionally do something where one foresees that one’s doing it will lead to death or harm, provided that one does not intend to bring the death or harm about. Some moral philosophers are also attracted by a non-absolutist version of the principle according to which, other things equal, it is more difficult to justify executing the intention to kill or bring about serious harm than it is to execute the intention to do something that one merely foresees will bring about death or harm. For my purposes the details of how the PDE is best specified can be left open. What will be important is the content that both the absolutist and non-absolutist versions of it share: that it is possible to draw a distinction between what agents intend and what they merely foresee, and that this distinction is morally significant. In this paper I will be concerned to rebut an important objection to double effect. Proponents of this objection, which is known as the ‘‘closeness problem,’’ argue that rational agents can truthfully claim they do not intend harm in nearly any situation, including those that are supposed to be paradigmatic illustrations of the PDE. In a recent paper Dana K. Nelkin and Samuel Rickless critique a number of responses to the closeness problem and suggest that it is insoluble. 1 My goal in this paper is to argue that they are wrong about this, and that the materials for a successful response are already present in the solutions they criticize. In particular, I aim to defend a & Joshua Stuchlik joshua.stuchlik@gmail.com 1 Department of Philosophy, University of St. Thomas, 2115 Summit Ave, JRC 241, St. Paul, MN 55105, USA 1 ‘‘So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short,’’ Nou ˆs 49 (2015):376–409. 123 J Value Inquiry DOI 10.1007/s10790-016-9554-9