Rational Expectations Equilibrium in Economies with Uncertain Delivery ⋆ Jo˜ ao Correia-da-Silva Faculdade de Economia. Universidade do Porto. PORTUGAL. Carlos Herv´ es-Beloso RGEA. Facultad de Econ´omicas. Universidad de Vigo. SPAIN. April 28th, 2007 Abstract. This paper studies general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. All trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. Agents buy lists of bundles that give them the right to receive one of the bundles. With rational expectations, that is, knowledge of the selection mechanism, agents can predict which bundle will be delivered in each state of nature, and thus equate the utility of the list with the utility of this bundle. We show by counter-example that rational expectations equilibrium may fail to exist. We also show that a perfectly informed trader with arbitrarily small endowments is enough to guarantee existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. Keywords: General equilibrium, Differential information, Rational expectations, Uncertain delivery, Lists of bundles. JEL Classification Numbers: C62, D51, D82. ⋆ Jo˜ ao Correia-da-Silva (joao@fep.up.pt) acknowledges support from CEMPRE, Funda¸ c˜ ao para a Ciˆ encia e Tecnologia and FEDER. Carlos Herv´ es-Beloso (cherves@uvigo.es) acknowledges support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog´ ıa and FEDER. 1