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Introduction: Folk Psychology as Theory We use mentalistic or psychological tenns constantly in describing, explaining, understanding, and generally coping with the behavior of others and ourselves. For several hundred years in the modem era (until, say, 50 years ago), the bad old explanation of how we do that and what exactly is going on when we do seemed, well, not unproblematic, but at least uncontroversial in its fundamental outlines: We enjoy direct and privileged access to our own mental states. This enables us, first, to abstract a set of psychological concepts from actual and self-intimating instances of psychological states. Furthennore, since the psychological concepts we have are abstracted directly from self- intimating instances, first-person application of those concepts is unproblematic. It is incorrigible and provides each of us with certainty about his or her own psychological states. This knowledge is primordial. On its basis we build up knowledge of everything external to our minds. From the materials we have direct access to we (somehow) construct and apply concepts of physical objects and events. More problematically, once we have the core set of concepts and some knowledge of our own psychological states, we can begin to apply psychological concepts to describe, explain, understand, interpret, and generally cope with others as well. This requires the assumption that the observable behavior of others is tied to their internal psychological states in the same ways and in the same kinds of patterns that we find connect our own psychological states and behavior. The argument for that assumption is a pretty weak induction by analogy, and this was a stumbling block for the In: M.P. Wolf and M.N. Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars (Po=nail Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 92), pp. 53-84. Amsterdam/NewYork: Rodopi, 2006.