https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122419832497 American Sociological Review 2019, Vol. 84(2) 308–333 © American Sociological Association 2019 DOI: 10.1177/0003122419832497 journals.sagepub.com/home/asr Sociological theories have long sought to understand the role cognition plays in social process (e.g., Bourdieu 1990; Giddens 1984; Lizardo 2017; Vaisey 2009). In recent years, a “dual-process” model of cognition has emerged as a candidate framework for study- ing the sociological implications of cognitive processes in a rigorous fashion. Supported by a large body of empirical work in psychology and other cognitive sciences, the dual-process framework posits that there are two general types of cognition (Lizardo et al. 2016). The first type is characterized by automatic execu- tion, and is often fast, effortless, and occurs with little conscious awareness (hereafter automatic cognition). The second type is characterized as intentional, more effortful, conscious, and executes more slowly (hereafter deliberate cognition). Dual-process approaches have yielded new insights into important sociological questions, such as the role of motivation in explaining behavior (Chaves 832497ASR XX X 10.1177/0003122419832497American Sociological ReviewMiles et al. research-article 2019 a University of Toronto b Arizona State University c University of Oklahoma Corresponding Author: Andrew Miles, Department of Sociology, “New North Building,” 6th Floor, University of Toronto Mississauga, 3359 Mississauga Road, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada L5L 1C6 E-mail: andrew.miles@utoronto.ca Measuring Automatic Cognition: Advancing Dual- Process Research in Sociology Andrew Miles, a Raphaël Charron-Chénier, b and Cyrus Schleifer c Abstract Dual-process models are increasingly popular in sociology as a framework for theorizing the role of automatic cognition in shaping social behavior. However, empirical studies using dual- process models often rely on ad hoc measures such as forced-choice surveys, observation, and interviews whose relationships to underlying cognitive processes are not fully established. In this article, we advance dual-process research in sociology by (1) proposing criteria for measuring automatic cognition, and (2) assessing the empirical performance of two popular measures of automatic cognition developed by psychologists. We compare the ability of the Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT), the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), and traditional forced-choice measures to predict process-pure estimates of automatic influences on individuals’ behavior during a survey task. Results from three studies focusing on politics, morality, and racial attitudes suggest the AMP provides the most valid and consistent measure of automatic cognitive processes. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for sociological practice. Keywords dual-process models, automatic cognition, measurement, practical consciousness