REVIEW ARTICLE The mind-body problem in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience: a physicalist naturalist solution Sandro Nannini 1,2 Received: 16 May 2018 /Accepted: 19 May 2018 # Springer-Verlag Italia S.r.l., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Using an analysis of a voluntary action caused by a visual perception, I suggest that the three fundamental characteristics of this perception (being conscious, self-conscious, and provided with a content) are neurologically implemented by three distinct higher order properties of brain dynamics. This hypothesis allows me to sketch out a physicalist naturalist solution to the mind-body problem. According to this solution, primary phenomenal consciousness is neither a non-physical substance, nor a non-physical property but simply the Bformat ^ that the brain gives to a part of its dynamics in order to obtain a fine tuning with its environment when the body acts on it. Keywords Cognitive neuroscience . Epistemology . Consciousness . Self . Intentionality . Mind-body problem The mind-body problem I am driving, I see that the traffic light is red, then I brake and stop my car. My conscious perception that the traffic light appears to me to be red is caused by the fact that according to common sense the traffic light is actually red. This percep- tion in turn causes together with other conscious or uncon- scious mental states and dispositions of mine my action of pressing the brake pedal. In the language of folk psychology, this reconstruction of my action is also a good explanation of why I stopped my car: The traffic light was red! However, if you shift from the language of folk psychology to the language of physics and other natural sciences, you can see that when you say that a traffic light is red, you mean that a lamp inside the traffic light emits electromagnetic waves with a length comprised between 620 and 750 nm. These electro- magnetic waves are the true distal stimulus of my perception: A colorless physical event that is very different from the con- tent of my perception. In the language of the hard sciences, this stimulus is the cause of the brain processes that in turn cause the motor response of pressing the brakes. What is the relationship between the two descriptions (and implicitly explanations) of my voluntary action, the former formulated in the language of folk psychology and the latter in the language of physics, chemistry, and biology? In the final analysis, this is the essence of the mind-body problem! The solutions given to this problem are numerous [1], but the fun- damental ones from classical antiquity up until today are three: Bmind-body dualism ^ [ 2 ], Bphysicalism ^ [ 3 ], and Bfunctionalism^ or Bcognitivism^ [4]. Dualism presupposes in its more important version (the ontological interactionist version, that is, the Cartesian one) that mind and body belong to two distinct orders of reality and are capable of causally interacting with each other. With re- gard to my example, this kind of dualism can be schematically represented as follows (Fig. 1): According to interactionist ontological dualism, the causal chain that goes from the distal stimulus to the mo- tor response is interrupted inside the brain by the inter- vention of the conscious mind qua entity or property ex- traneous to the physical world. According to Cartesian dualists, without this interference of my conscious mind in the activity of my brain, my action would not be vol- untary. But what neurological studies attest to the exis- tence of such interference by the conscious mind in brain activity during the sensorimotor coordination process that takes place when a voluntary action is performed? Many studies seem to attest to the opposite! According to B. Libet and many other neuroscientists, the awareness of moving a finger only arises in the mind after the * Sandro Nannini sandro.nannini@unisi.it 1 Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Politiche e Cognitive, Università degli Studi di Siena, via Roma 56, 53100 Siena, Italy 2 Siena, Italy Neurological Sciences https://doi.org/10.1007/s10072-018-3455-6