Philosophia Vol. 6 No. 2 Pp. 309-315 June 1976 REPLY TO KRIMSKY ON D-N EXPLANATION THOMAS NICKLES Sheldon Krimsky I construes my counterexample to the Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model of scientific explanation in such a manner that the argument is deductively incomplete. Its completion, he says, requires a universal, lawlike premiss - which suffices to bring the example into line with the D-N model. In Part I, I show that a slightly different interpretation of the counterexample escapes Krimsky's criticism. Then, in Parts II and II1, I raise some issues concerning the significance of this sort of "counterexample," issues which I cannot explore in this brief note. I My purported counterexample to the D-N model was a deduc- tive explanatory argument which employed an accidental genera- lization instead of a lawlike statement, thus apparently falsifying the "covering law" thesis that every fully articulated (potential) explanation-why contains at least one law-like statement. The example was this: All the balls in the urn were red. Seymour drew a ball from the urn. Seymour drew a red ball from the urn. I did not formalize the argument. In Krimsky's final formulation, it is plainly invalid: (x) (Bx 9 UXtl D Rxtl ) (~Ix) (Bx 9 Uxt, 9 Dsxt2) (~Jx) (Bx 9 Dsxt2 9 Rxt2) 309