Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues Terry Horgan 1 & Matjaž Potrč 2 & Vojko Strahovnik 3 Received: 29 August 2017 / Accepted: 9 April 2018 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract We argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely (if ever) voluntary, nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its significant phenomenological similarities to voluntary-agency experience. An impor- tant consequence is that epistemic rationality, as a central feature of belief fixation, is an agentive notion. This enables us to introduce and develop a distinction between core and ancillary epistemic virtues. Core epistemic virtues involve several inter-related kinds of epistemic rationality in belief fixation. Other Bhabits of mind^ pertinent to belief fixation constitute ancillary epistemic virtues. Finally, we discuss the relationship between both kinds of virtues, offering a unified account of epistemic virtuousness. Keywords Epistemic virtuousness . Agency . Rationality . Truth . Ancillary epistemic virtues 1 Introduction We will argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely (if ever) voluntary, nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its Acta Anal https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-0349-4 * Vojko Strahovnik vojko.strahovnik@teof.uni-lj.si Terry Horgan thorgan@email.arizona.edu Matjaž Potrč matjaz.potrc@guest.arnes.si 1 Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 213 Social Sciences, 1145 E. South Campus Drive, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA 2 Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Aškerčeva 2, SI, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia 3 Faculty of Theology, University of Ljubljana, Poljanska 4, SI, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia