http://ijfr.sciedupress.com International Journal of Financial Research Vol. 12, No. 3, Special Issue; 2021 Published by Sciedu Press 446 ISSN 1923-4023 E-ISSN 1923-4031 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance in Saudi Arabia Helmi A. Boshnak 1 1 Faculty of Economics and Administration, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Correspondence: Helmi A. Boshnak, Faculty of Economics and Administration, King Abdulaziz University, Building 121 office 3132, 80201 Jeddah 21589, Saudi Arabia. Tel: 966-555-560-070. Received: October 31, 2020 Accepted: December 24, 2020 Online Published: March 14, 2021 doi:10.5430/ijfr.v12n3p446 URL: https://doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v12n3p446 Abstract This paper examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms including board size, independence, and meeting frequency, audit committee size and meeting frequency, CEO duality and ownership concentration on the operational, financial and market performance of Saudi listed firms using a contingent theoretical-based framework drawing on agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory. This study examines 210 listed Saudi Stock Exchange firms over the timeframe 2017 to 2019. The paper applies both a manual content and regression analysis approach. The results show that firm performance deteriorates with board size and independence, audit committee and meeting frequency, and the presence of CEO role duality, while performance improves with board meeting frequency and ownership concentration. Thus, Saudi firms should respond by maintaining smaller boards and more frequent meetings, keeping the Chair and CEO roles separate, and maintaining smaller audit committees with more focused meetings. Further, the appointment of independent directors only makes a meaningful contribution to firm performance where they are truly independent. Finally, more concentrated ownership tends to encourage better firm performance due to the regime of monitoring and discipline concomitant with more powerful shareholders. The implications of this paper are threefold. First, the implementation by Saudi Arabia of the latest corporate governance regulations and IFRS adoption almost certainly impact firm performance markedly. Second, corporate governance regulations should recognize the role of more frequent board meetings and more concentrated ownership in enhancing corporate performance. Third, stakeholders should apply pressure on investee firms to maintain smaller boards, engage genuinely independent directors, separate the role of Chairman and CEO, and maintain smaller audit committees with fewer and more effective meetings. The results should help corporate boards when deciding on the best corporate governance mechanisms to enhance firm performance. Further, the study should provide policy makers with a better understanding of the corporate governance structures required to promote better performance by drawing on existing theories and the empirical modelling, in an emerging economy setting such as Saudi Arabia, a new and broader data set, thereby informing better future policy and protecting shareholders‟ interests. Keywords: corporate governance mechanisms, firm performance, agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, Saudi Arabia 1. Introduction Corporate governance is a framework of laws, policies, rules and instructions that affects the manner in which a firm is controlled and managed with the objective of conferring fairness and transparency in its relationship with its shareholders. This framework, which consists of both internal and external contracts between employees and shareholders, governs the distribution of responsibilities, conditions and rewards to avoid conflicting interests. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) promoted a more encompassing characterisation in 2001, such that "corporate governance refers to the private and public institutions, including laws, regulations and accepted business practices, which together govern the relationship, in a market economy, between corporate managers and entrepreneurs (corporate insiders) on one hand, and those who invest resources in corporations, on the other" (OECD, 2004). Thus, corporate governance requires a set of measures and rules that simplify the decision processes for shareholders. The attention on corporate governance has strengthened over recent decades due to an increase in high-profile bankruptcies caused by financial accounting errors or fraud, exacerbated by the absence of