Collective resistance to collective collaboration: a leader’s introspection Atri Sengupta and Bhaurao Sonawane Introduction It was a sunny day on August 13, 2012. Mr. Surya Kant Mishra, the chief executive officer and managing director (CEO and MD) of Utkal Alumina International Limited (UAIL)[1], was about to deliver his retirement speech. While quickly going through the points he had jotted down on a piece of paper, he became very emotional and was lost in deep thoughts. He was wondering introspectively, “how effective were my actions as a leader of the company? How much could I have engaged the stakeholders in all the company’s concerns?” Background The reference point for the story was UAIL, an ambitious Greenfield alumina refinery, co- generation power plant and bauxite mine, which had been struggling to be commissioned since 1992-1993. It was a joint initiative of three conglomerates as follows: INDAL, Tata Industries Limited (TIL) and Norsk Hydro Aluminum (NHA) of Norway intended to set up a 100 per cent export-oriented 1 million tons per annum (MTPA) alumina refinery. Afterward, the capacity of the alumina refinery was planned to be 1.5 MTPA, expandable to 3 MTPA, while bauxite mining was planned to be 4.5 MTPA, expandable to 8.5 MTPA. The capacity of the co-generation power plant was to be 3  30 megawatts (MW). The state government initiated a land acquisition process for the plant in 1993. Around 3,000 acres of land were acquired from 24 villages in the Kashipur block of Odisha[2], mostly dominated by its tribal inhabitants (indigenous peoples). Kashipur block in Rayagara district was characterized by its low socioeconomic status, in which the per capita income for each family was far below the poverty line. Malnutrition, death from perennial diseases, a low literacy rate and poor educational and medical facilities were predominant in the area (please refer to Exhibit 1 for the socioeconomic statuses of the villages affected by the project and Exhibit 2 for photography of the area). Majority of the population earned their livelihood mainly from crop production with little support from the State Administration. Sometimes, farmers received seeds free of cost, but irrigation, guidance on the cultivation of new and improved varieties of seeds and other forms of support were not available. A few families, who didn’t have their own land, were depended on non-agricultural activities, e.g. poultry, fisheries, as marginal workers, etc. Despite the poor socioeconomic and health statuses of the region, land acquisition for the project was highly criticized and resisted by the indigenous peoples, alongside anti- industrialization groups and several other social agencies. These groups believed that industrialization in the area would affect the lives of indigenous peoples adversely and they were demanding the return of the land to those residents. This led to a massive delay in the project’s initiation of more than two decades as indigenous peoples were not ready to release Atri Sengupta is based at the Department of OB and HR, Indian Institute of Management Sambalpur, Sambalpur, India. Bhaurao Sonawane is based at the Department of PGPWE, Indian Institute of Management Raipur, Raipur, India. Disclaimer. This case is written solely for educational purposes and is not intended to represent successful or unsuccessful managerial decision-making. The authors may have disguised names; financial and other recognisable information to protect confidentiality. DOI 10.1108/EEMCS-09-2019-0229 VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020, pp. 1-32, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 2045-0621 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 1