Social Philosophy & Policy Vol. 7 Issue 2, ISSN 0265-0525 EQUAL RESPECT AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY* BY GERALD DWORKIN INTRODUCTION In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the question of when, if ever, the state may use coercion to enforce majority views about what types of conduct are right or wrong, noble or base, decent or indecent. Such interest has been generated by both political and philosophibal pressures. In recent political history, controversies over such issues as abortion, homosexuality, pornography, textbooks in schools, new reproductive technologies such as surrogate parenting and in vitro fertilization, and faith healing have focused attention on the role of the state in supporting or opposing various moral views. In political philosophy, often a theoretical reflection of the political debates of the time, we have seen renewed attempts to provide a satisfactory foundation for traditional liberal (in the sense of Millian) views of the legitimate scope of state power. In particular, there has been an emphasis on the neutrality of the liberal state and the right of individuals to be treated as equals by the state. I want in this essay to examine the arguments advanced against the enforcement of morality by Ronald Dworkin. While I do not believe his arguments succeed, they present strong and subtle points which must be addressed by those (such as myself) who are more sympathetic to the legitimacy of some forms of the enforcement of values. I. THE RIGHT TO MORAL INDEPENDENCE In "Is There a Right to Pornography ?", Ronald Dworkin addresses the specific issue of pornography and the more general question of the enforcement of morality. 1 One of the interesting features of Dworkin's view is that in arguing against other ways of reaching his conclusion, particularly that of the Williams Report, he presents the opposing view in very strong and attractive terms. 2 He points out that any argument which proceeds from some idea of autonomy (in * I would like to express my appreciation to All Souls College, Oxford, where the final version of this essay was written. I would also like to thank Ronald Dworkin for helpful discussions of his views. Needless to say, he does not endorse my criticisms. 1 Ronald Dworkin, "Is There a Right to Pornography?", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, no. 2. (Summer 1981). All quotes are from this article unless otherwise specified. 2 Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship Cmmnd 7772, HMSO, London, 1979. This committee, chaired by the philosopher Bernard Williams, examined the legal restrictions in England on written material, film, and live performance from the standpoint of their sexual content. Its general recommendations were that it is legitimate to have some restrictions on the availability of material considered obscene, but not for such material to be forbidden. An exception to the latter was the ban on live sex shows.