No pretense to honesty: County government corruption in Mississippi * GÖKHAN R. KARAHAN, † LAURA RAZZOLINI ‡ AND WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II ‡ † Department of Economics and Finance, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, LA 70310 USA ‡ Department of Economics, University of Mississippi, P. O. Box 1848, University, MS 38677- 1848 USA January 2004 Please do not quote without permission ABSTRACT This paper explores the determinants of governmental corruption exploiting a unique dataset generated by an FBI investigation of county purchasing activities that ultimately led to the conviction of 55 of Mississippi‟s 410 county supervisors, one county road foreman, two state highway commissioners and 13 vendors on bribery, extortion and other felony charges. Evidence is reported that corruption occurs more frequently in rural counties where voter-taxpayers have fewer years of schooling. Corruption is also more likely in counties where supervisors are paid more, ceteris paribus, casting doubt on the proposition that efficiency wages purchase honest public officials. JEL Keywords: corruption; rent seeking; county governments * We are indebted to James Crockett for generously granting us early access to extracts from his since-published book manuscript. We benefited from discussions with Robert Tollison and from the comments of Hilary Shughart, attendees at the 2002 and 2003 meetings of the Southern Economic Association and the 2003 meetings of the Public Choice Society. Among the latter group, especially helpful suggestions were offered by Lee Coppock, Arthur Denzau, Fred McChesney, Michael Munger and Paul Pecorino. As is customary, however, we take full responsibility for any errors herein.