77 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS NUMBER 1 (SUMMER 2009) 2009, 10, 77 - 85 77 I set out in this paper to answer a seemingly simple question: What do we do when we are said to imagine and under what circumstances do we do it? In particular, I focus on audi- tory imagining. I begin by presenting some traditional conceptions of mental imagery and perception. I then describe a functional analysis of psychological terms as suggested by Skinner (1945), and extend that analysis to the term perception. Next I ofer a behavioral interpreta- tion of perception and, specifcally, of auditory imagining, followed by a discussion of selected neuroimaging studies that support that inter- pretation. I conclude that when we are said to be imagining speech or music, we are engaging in sub-vocal behavior (self-talk and self-singing), and argue that this interpretation is parsimoni- ous because it is consistent with the assumption of behavioral continuity. Traditional Conceptions of Mental Imagery Traditional descriptions of mental imagery are couched in terms of memory. For example, according to Kosslyn, Gannis, and Tompson (2001), “Mental imagery occurs when perceptu- al information is accessed from memory, giving rise to the experience of ‘seeing with the mind’s eye,’ ‘hearing with the mind’s ear’ and so on. By contrast, perception occurs when information is registered directly from the senses” (p. 635). In particular, according to Kosslyn and Tompson (2003), “. . . mental imagery occurs when a . . . short-term memory (STM) representation is present but the stimulus is not actually being viewed . . .” (p. 723). Similarly, Finke (1989) defnes mental imagery as “the mental inven- tion or recreation of an experience that in at least some respects resembles the experience of actually perceiving an object or an event, either in conjunction with, or in the absence of, direct sensory stimulation” (p. 2). What these defnitions share with the be- havior-analytic account is the view that mental imagery occurs in the absence of actual stimuli. Te present position, however, difers from the traditional accounts in considering mental imagery (i.e., imagining) to be a form of percep- tion. Nevertheless, the traditional descriptions are not very helpful because they are largely circular and do not identify what someone actu- ally does when she imagines. Some psychologists have argued that there are no images to be seen Portions of this article were presented at the 5 th International Conference of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Oslo, Nor- way. Te author is grateful to Matthew P. Normand and Julie A. Riggott for their helpful comments and suggestions. Address for correspondence: Henry D. Schlinger, Depart- ment of Psychology, California State University, Los Angeles, CA 90032-8227. E-mail: hschlin@calstatela.edu Auditory Imagining Henry D. Schlinger, Jr. California State University, Los Angeles In this paper, I tackle the thorny problem of auditory imagining from a behavior-analytic perspective. I previously suggested that listening to (i.e., perceiving) speech or music involves sub-vocal behaviors (Schlinger, 2008a). In the present paper, I extend that argument to suggest that imagining hearing speech or music also involves sub-vocal behaviors (self-talking and self-singing). Tus, listening and auditory imagining are not cognitive processes, but behaviors. Tis interpretation is consistent with an assumption of behavioral continuity and is supported by numerous brain-imaging studies. Keywords: mental imagery, auditory imagery, perception, behavior analysis, sub-vocal behavior, neuroimaging