Process Safety and Environmental Protection 116 (2018) 92–105 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Process Safety and Environmental Protection journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/psep A Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems Hazard Analysis (RIPSHA) approach: Part I plant system layer Prerna Jain a , William J. Rogers a , Hans J. Pasman a , Kelly K. Keim b , M. Sam Mannan a,* a Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-3122, USA b Process Safety Consultant, Spring, TX, USA a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 2 July 2017 Received in revised form 23 August 2017 Accepted 19 January 2018 Available online 31 January 2018 Keywords: Resilience Process safety Risk management LNG Organization Human System a b s t r a c t In recent years, the chemical process industry has witnessed increased process safety management chal- lenges. One of the initial steps in process safety and risk management of any facility is hazard identification and analysis. Two types of factors: 1) technical (e.g., equipment malfunction), and 2) social (e.g., human and organizational factors) are important in analyzing hazards of a socio-technical process system as a whole. With the conventional process hazard analysis (PHA) methods, there is a tendency to overlook the potential impact of socio-technical systems on the health and sustainment of safeguards. This disregard leads to ignoring social factors, such as shift handover communication, downtime, operating and main- tenance procedures, and more. This need calls for the development of a holistic and integrated systems framework for hazard analysis. This paper presents a novel hazards analysis approach that incorporates both technical and social factors within a single analysis method called Resilience-based Integrated Pro- cess Systems Hazard Analysis (RIPSHA). This approach is based on the following resilience aspects – ‘early detection’, ‘error tolerant design’, ‘plasticity’, and ‘recoverability’. This work establishes and presents a worksheet for analysis of hazards within process systems. The paper concludes with an example of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) process system to illustrate the key concepts of this integrated approach. © 2018 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction In recent years, it has been observed that the increasing devel- opment in technology and rising awareness amongst members of the public have led to process safety and risk management chal- lenges. Incidents have continued to occur in the process industry with various underlying causes in spite of the advanced risk man- agement methodologies that have been implemented (Jain et al., 2016). Some of these causes are increased competition and cost pressure, complex technology, energy saving in view of climate change, better process efficiency, and a series of human and organi- zational changes. Several examples of such changes such as fatigue due to long hours, less competence and more indifference, rapid job rotation, retirement, job insecurity, time pressure, bad main- tenance, less inspection by government, etc. have been reported in the incident investigation reports. Process hazards are mainly observed to be responsible for consequences such as fire, explo- sion, or toxic release. It has been observed that a holistic analysis of * Corresponding author. E-mail address: mannan@tamu.edu (M.S. Mannan). the entire system that is missing from the current hazard and risk analysis techniques has resulted in a failure to identify the anatomy of incidents that have led to major catastrophes (Rathnayaka et al., 2011b). Some of the remarkable incidents in process and haz- ardous materials storage industries, such as the Bhopal tragedy (Eckerman, 2005; Khan and Abbasi, 1999; Willey et al., 2007), the Piper Alpha (Flin, 2001; Flin et al., 1996; Pate-Cornell, 1993), the Flixborough disaster (Kletz, 2001; Tauseef et al., 2011), BP Texas city (Holmstrom et al., 2006; Le Coze, 2008), the West fertilizer explo- sion (Pittman et al., 2014), and the Tianjin explosion, are examples of sociotechnical systems failures. According to Rathnayka et al., one of the leading causes of process system failures is increased complexity of system elements (people, equipment, procedures, software, and hardware) and their interactions (Rathnayaka et al., 2011a). Essential initial steps in process safety and risk management of any facility are hazard identification and hazard analysis. A large volume of work can be found in the literature on different hazard identification and analysis techniques and advanced methodolo- gies, as summarized in Section 2.1. (Dunjó et al., 2010; Khan et al., 2015). However, these methods have been considered inadequate in identifying and analyzing the hazards involved in most incidents https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2018.01.016 0957-5820/© 2018 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.