147 IsraelI: Mossadegh and the suez CrIsIs TwilighT of Colonialism: mossadegh and The suez Crisis Ofer Israeli Dr. Ofer Israeli is a visiting researcher at the Center for Peace & Security Studies (CPASS), at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is doing his postdoctoral research in the feld of the Complexity of International Relations. * © 2013, The Author Middle East Policy © 2013, Middle East Policy Council T he commercial disagreement be- tween Iran and the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was the motive behind the 1951 Anglo-Iranian Abadan Crisis. 1 The Abadan plant and its facilities were the property of AIOC, a company in which the British government was the major share- holder. The dispute was based on a gigantic clash of economic interests between Brit- ish imperialism and Iranian patriotism. It began in May 1951, after the Majles, Iran’s parliament, headed by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, 2 passed a law that nationalized the AIOC and the oil refnery at Abadan under the new National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). 3 From London’s perspective, Mossadegh’s nationalization of the AIOC was an outrage, 4 since the AIOC refnery at Abadan was Britain’s single largest overseas asset. 5 In May 1951, the British minister of defense was quoted as saying, “If Persia was allowed to get away with it, Egypt and other Middle East countries would be en- couraged to think they could try things on: the next thing there might be an attempt to nationalize the Suez Canal.” 6 A month later, before the Abadan Crisis had actu- ally erupted, Churchill said, “It would be a disaster if our personnel were hustled and bullied out of Abadan.” 7 Writing on October 3, 1951, the day the British were evacuated from Abadan, 8 Harold Macmillan recognized the Egyptian linkage as he predicted that the Suez Canal Zone would soon follow, consequently damaging British interests in the region. 9 Two days after the British evacuation from Abadan, in an editorial published on Octo- ber 5, The Times used Britain’s withdrawal to warn London to learn from its mistakes and not to follow this attitude elsewhere in the future: It is not a failure that Britain can afford to repeat. The lessons of a * I gratefully acknowledge support from the Center of Peace and Security Studies (CPASS), at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and Prof. Daniel Byman. I am also grateful to Robert J. Lieber, An- drew Bennett, and Hadas Kroitoru for their most helpful comments.