1 THE RUSSIAN FAR RIGHT A Changing Landscape of Spaces of Hate Mihai Varga CITE AS: Varga, M. (2024). The Russian Far Right. A Changing Landscape of Spaces of Hate. In Kondor, K., & Littler, M. (Eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Far-right Extremism in Europe. London & New York: Routledge. Pp. 39-51 Abstract This contribution traces how the Russian far right developed across several decades: its inception in the early 1980s around networks of intellectuals interested in preserving cultural sites and Aryan and Eurasian mythmaking; its growing adoption of neo-Nazism, white supremacism and Straight Edge in the 1990s and 2000s together with establishing nationwide political and paramilitary organisations; its involvement in a wave of violence leaving almost 500 people dead between 2004 and 2009, answered by authorities with imprisoning or killing several far-right leaders and outlawing main organisations; a less violent phase in the 2010s, with the far-right abandoning street violence in favour of promoting a certain “healthy lifestyle” that honours one’s “race” or nation; and finally, the movement’s decline, following state repression as well as the 2014 Ukraine crisis, dividing the movement between “racists” and “nationalists”, while providing leaders and movement activists with an opportunity to leave the country. Key organisations nevertheless survived around a temporary agenda signalling loyalty to the political regime and adopting state-close ideologies. The present contribution argues that despite the decline since the 2010s, the far right turned out capable of maintaining or transforming its spaces of hate, the settings in which it disseminates its message and ultimately survives. Introduction The Russian far right underwent tremendous change despite appearing at first sight extremely young with its roughly 40 years of existence. From isolated and mostly clandestine networks in the 1960s and 1970s, it grew in the early 1980s around intellectuals interested in preserving cultural sites, historical revisionism and Aryan and Eurasian mythmaking. It embraced neo-Nazism in the 1990s and White Supremacism and Straight Edge in the 2000s. It was an important protagonist of the 1993 stand-off between President Boris Yeltsin and Parliament, with many future leaders and activists defending Parliament and radicalising following their defeat to believe that foreign forces occupied their country. Following its growing organisational sophistication and rise of skinheads in clandestine organisations, it saw massive involvement in an unprecedented wave of political violence, consisting of a campaign murdering close to 500 people in 2004–2009. By the end of that decade, it faced the authorities’ strong-handed response, leading to the imprisonment or killing of many far-right leaders and outlawing most organisations. A less openly violent phase followed in the 2010s when the far right’s main protagonists invested their efforts in promoting a certain “healthy lifestyle” that honours one’s “race” or nation rather than in political campaigning. The Ukraine crisis of 2013–2014 drove a wedge between “racists” supporting the Ukrainian government and “nationalists” siding with pro- Russian separatists while providing many leaders and movement activists with an opportunity to leave the country and escape repression and imprisonment. Eurasian and Orthodox fundamentalist groups gained the upper hand. The latter took over as the far-right scene’s most important presence on the streets, leading mobilisations less against Central Asians and Caucasians, and more against “blasphemous” bands and movies, queers, and liberals. In this chapter I present the transformation of the Russian far right by detailing its main phases, from emergence to violence to organisations signalling political regime loyalty and abandonment of militant and revolutionary national-socialism. The movement’s development raises