that the evidence did not indicate significant limita- tions of adaptive functioning, according to the Briseno criteria, nor was there evidence of the mani- festation of intellectual disability before the age of 18. Thus, the appeals court concluded that although there were some factual questions about whether he was intellectually disabled, the state court had prop- erly evaluated the conflicting evidence, and there was no error in its conclusion that he did not meet criteria for intellectual disability. Discussion Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins that execution of intellectually disabled individuals is unconstitutional, many thorny questions have arisen concerning the determination of intellectual disabil- ity. Some of the concerns have included the defini- tions of intellectual disability adopted by states, the accuracy of IQ scores, and whether there should be rigid cutoff scores (as in the recently heard arguments before the Supreme Court, in Transcript of Oral Ar- gument, Hall v. Florida, No. 1210882. Available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ar- gument_transcripts/12-10882_7758.pdf. Accessed March 3, 2014). Hernandez did not involve ques- tions about the appropriateness of Texas’ standards for intellectual disability, but rather whether the standards were properly applied. Of particular inter- est to mental health professionals are the questions raised in this case of administration and scoring er- rors, cultural differences (Mr. Hernandez was a Mex- ican national, and there are hints that there may have been a language problem, as most of the tests admin- istered were nonverbal), and assessment of effort and feigning. Given the very high stakes in Atkins cases, this case serves as a reminder of the need for properly trained evaluators who are familiar with the relevant tests and can inform the court of the limitations of many tests standardized in the United States when applied to individuals from different cultures. Fur- thermore, it is concerning in this case that assessment of feigning was seemingly based at least in part on idiosyncratic clinical judgment (e.g., that the defen- dant volunteered that he was a member of a prison gang), rather than on validated instruments designed specifically to address feigning and proper effort. Disclosures of financial or other potential conflicts of interest: None. Denial of Social Security Benefits In Contrast to the Treating Doctor’s Opinion Adria M. Carney, MD Fellow in Forensic Psychiatry Jeremy A. Hinton, MD Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry Raymond K. Molden, MD Assistant Clinic Professor of Psychiatry Department of Psychiatry University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences Little Rock, AR Denial of Social Security Benefits Were Upheld (Despite the Controlling Decision of a Prior Administrative Law Judge) Due to Evidence of Improvement (Despite the Treating Physician’s Opinion) In Rudd v. Comm’r of Social Security, 531 F. App’x 719 (6th Cir. 2013), Jerry Rudd contended that the Social Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in failing to apply the prior ALJ’s residual func- tional capacity (RFC) finding, as required by Drum- mond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997), that subsequent ALJ findings are bound by previous ALJ findings unless evidence of improve- ment in the claimant is presented. Mr. Rudd also contended that his new mental evaluation estab- lished that he had greater mental impairment and limitations and that the ALJ erred in not giving con- trolling weight to the opinions of his treating physi- cian. Mr. Rudd appealed the denial of his disability claims in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit after an ALJ found that he had an RFC for reduced range of sedentary work with some men- tal limitations and that he was not disabled, in that he could perform other work. Facts of the Case Mr. Rudd had suffered various injures from an April 2002 motor vehicle accident, had had surgery on his right knee in 2005, and had had treatment for depression. He filed applications for a period of dis- ability, disability insurance benefits, and Supple- mental Security Income. The ALJ denied these claims, finding him not disabled from June 1, 2003 through June 25, 2007. The ALJ found that he had severe impairments of cognitive and adjustment dis- orders and was unable to carry out detailed instruc- Legal Digest 389 Volume 42, Number 3, 2014