Air Operational Research in Support of Helicopter Defensive Tactic Development Gokhan Ibal 1 ; Mario Selvestrel 2 ; Ziming Tu 1 ; Erdal Akgol 1 ; Andrew Graham 2 ; David Murray 2 ;Erin Clarke 1 1. Air Operations Division - DSTO Firstname.Surname@defence.gov.au 2. KESEM International Firstname.Surname@kesem.com.au Abstract. DSTOs Air Operations Division (AOD) uses operations research to support Australias air combat capabilities. Operations research (OR) is used to enhance the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) use of aircraft, weapons, sensors and associated equipments through upgrades, new acquisitions and improved tactical deployment. BattleModel (BM) is a flexible simulation environment suitable for performing operations research. DSTO AOD and KESEM International developed BattleModel, to support a wide range of studies from detailed engagement scenarios to mission level scenarios. BattleModel is used to manage the coordinated integration of sensor, weapon, platform, environment, and operator behaviour models, data collection, scenario specification, and display in an OR study. State Machine (SM) Agent Technology is used to model the decision making of military operators in representative operationally realistic missions, developed in cooperation with the ADF, with mini-scenarios or vignettes based on the platforms defined role within the ADF. The SM Agent Technology implements a cognitive model based on the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop and concepts from BDI (Belief, Desires, Intention) theory. Agile representation of tactical behaviours is a particular strength of the SM Agent approach. This paper describes a research approach undertaken in AOD to explore optimum helicopter defensive tactics against a generic man portable surface to air missile. Results presented here are generic only and does not represent any real system. 1. INTRODUCTION Man portable air defence systems (MANPAD) are considered highly lethal against war fighting helicopters. From a helicopter pilots point of view, MANPADs are very hard to detect, avoid, engage and evade. New generation state-of-the-art sensor systems do not help pilots a great deal to detect an enemy soldier on the ground holding a 1 m long, 20cm diameter tube like MANPAD aimed against at them. If there is an undetected MANPAD in the area and it is locked against the helicopter, the only thing that informs the pilot about its existence is a missile- warning receiver (MWR) signal. The MWR system of the helicopter detects incoming missiles through their ultraviolet UV emissions and informs the pilot about their incoming angular direction. Within a very limited time after the MWR warning, the pilot has to follow a pre-defined set of rules (tactics) to avoid the incoming missiles. These include activating counter measure (CM) systems such as ejecting flares or chaff in the air to confuse the missile about whereabouts of its target; or manoeuvring the helicopter. A successful strike for MANPAD operator is also difficult. Environmental obstacles, such as terrain, trees, hills, clouds, sun etc, prevent a clear view of the helicopter to enable a successful lock on. Since helicopters move fast using terrain cover and shadowing techniques to reduce platform signature, MANPAD operator gets a very short window of opportunity to lock on to the helicopter and fire the missile. Most of the time, they can hear the helicopter noise, but they cannot precisely resolve the direction due to an echoing effect through hills and trees. However, if an operator is informed when and where the helicopter is approaching by other observers, then he or she will have a good chance of locking on and firing the missile at the helicopter. The purpose of the research work presented in this paper is aimed at finding the optimum defensive tactics that increase the helicopter survivability and consequently reduce the missiles probability of success. In order to study the optimum defensive tactics, it was decided that MANPAD operator should perform with maximum efficiency. For this reasons, we have stressed the test scenarios (vignettes) selected for the study in favour of the MANPAD operator by giving him or her an ability to know the exact position of the helicopter. Due to time and resource limitations, helicopter defensive tactics including ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) have been left out of the scope of this study. This means the tactics explored here are helicopter platform performance related only and do not contain deployment of flare, chaff or any other measures. Effect of usage of these measures on the defensive tactics explored here is left for future studies.