Corruption and Voter Participation: Evidence from the U.S. States * Monica Escaleras † Peter T. Calcagno ‡ William F. Shughart II § February 23, 2008 Abstract: The literature on voter turnout focuses on the determinants of the electorate’s vote supply. There is growing recognition, however, that the demanders of votes – candidates, political parties and interest groups – have strong incentives to invest resources in mobilizing support on Election Day. We test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of holding public office and, hence, elicit greater demand-side effort in building winning coalitions. Analyzing a panel dataset of public officials convicted of misusing their offices between 1977 and 2005, we find, after controlling for other influential factors, that governmental corruption raises voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections. JEL Classifications: D72, K4, H1 Keywords: Political Corruption, Vote Demand, Voter Turnout, Rent-seeking * Paper presented at the 2007 Southern Economic Association Meetings, New Orleans, LA. We would like to thank, without implicating, the conference participants for useful comments. † Monica Escaleras: (Corresponding Author) Florida Atlantic University, Department of Economics, 777 Glades Road, Boca Raton, FL 33431; E-mail: mescaler@fau.edu ; Phone: (561) 297-1312; FAX: (561) 297-2542. ‡ Peter T. Calcagno: College of Charleston, Department of Economics and Finance, 66 George Street, Charleston, SC 29424; E-mail: calcagnop@cofc.edu ; Phone: (843) 953-4279. § William Shughart: University of Mississippi, Department of Economics, 374 Holman Hall, University, MS 38677; E- mail: shughart@olemiss.edu ; Phone: (662) 915-7579.