BOOK REVIEW Paul O. Carrese, Democracy in Moderation: Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Sustainable Liberalism New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 230 pp. $99.99. ISBN: 978–1107121058 T. Shelley 1 Published online: 28 August 2017 # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2017 In a mostly neglected Platonic dialogue, Lovers, Socrates re- counts his discussion with a group of rivalrous lovers, primar- ily about what it is to philosophize and whether or not it is noble to do so. In the course of discussion the notion of Bthe measured amount^ of things, or moderation, emerges for con- sideration, as illustrated by the following: ‘And is to be ignorant of oneself to be moderate or not to be moderate?’ ‘Not to be moderate.’ ‘Then to know oneself is to be moderate?’ ‘Yes, I say,’ he said. ‘It looks, then, as if this is what the writing in Delphi exhorts: to practice moderation and justice’ (138a5-11). This connection between self-knowledge and the principle of moderation is a central lesson of Paul Carrese’ s important new book, Democracy in Moderation. The link is doubly significant for Americans, as there is a Bnearly forgotten caus- al chain^ of thought and action—an entire Bheritage^—re- garding moderation that is manifest in the American political science of the Founding. Insofar as the rich philosophy of moderation undergirding the American constitutional order slowly recedes from memory, America risks no longer know- ing itself and thereby acting in ignorance—that is to say, im- moderately. Thus, Carrese plays the role of gentle gadfly by getting readers to reflect anew on a virtue that many lips may utter, but few consider in depth. Carrese presents the rich heritage of moderation as a dia- logue, after all, Bthe spirit of moderation^ is akin to Bthe spirit of Socratic conversation, held together by certain principles and stances about justice, but not reduced to the quarrels of sects or schools^ (203). The dialogue Carrese depicts is large- ly among moderns, occurring between Montesquieu, the American Founders, and Tocqueville, for whom philosophical and political moderation was Ba central concept explaining the development of both the theory and practice of moderate lib- eral constitutionalism^ (3). Carrese also includes discussion of an important American political scientist, Herbert Storing, whose thoughtful constitutionalist political science serves as a Bmodel and legacy of tough-minded, Socratic moderation^ (176). Ultimately, the dialogue stretches farther back to in- clude ancient and medieval ideas as well, not without interest- ing disputes and differences along the way. But Carrese’ s fo- cus is on the tension within modern thought. Thus, BMontesquieu and Tocqueville adapt the modified Socratic dialectic of the Aristotelian tradition, also found in Aquinas, which avoids fixation on a single, rationalist conception or method while also avoiding skepticism or relativism^ (81). What we fail to appreciate, Carrese therefore argues, is the extent to which Montesquieu, the Founders, and Tocqueville in succession, were successful at tempering numerous immod- erate tendencies of their modern predecessors and contempo- raries, while also adapting wisdom from the past. So much is part of our forgetfulness, and to our peril. As immoderation reemerges in our day we have fewer resources at our disposal to mitigate the worst of it. If moderation is invoked today, it is little understood—gen- erally deemed a tactic, rather than a genuine guiding principle. To the extent there are calls to recognize moderation as a virtue, it is predominantly on the level of private morality, regarding our personal choices. Politically, it is faintly recalled in weak tribute paid to the need for balancing institutions or centers of * T. Shelley trevormichaelshelley@gmail.com 1 634 – 10 Ave. NE, Calgary, AB T2E 0X8, Canada Soc (2017) 54:491–494 DOI 10.1007/s12115-017-0169-y