Call for Papers Corporate Governance: An International Review Special Issue on “Ownership and Corporate Governance across Institutional Contexts” Submission Deadline: September 1, 2020 Guest Editors Xavier Castañer, University of Lausanne, Switzerland Maria Goranova, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA Niels Hermes, University of Groningen, the Netherlands Nikolaos Kavadis, University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain Alessandro Zattoni, LUISS University, Italy BACKGROUND Ownership is the foundation of corporate governance (Zattoni, 2011), as “no firm exists without owners and the property rights allocated to these owners” (Aguilera & Crespí - Cladera, 2016: 50). In the last several decades, the ownership fabric of corporations has undergone a profound transformation (e.g., Kahle & Stulz, 2017). Individual investors, entrepreneurs and their families, the once ubiquitous owners (Rydqvist, Spizman, & Strebulaev, 2014), along with corporate investors, governmental ownership, and foundations, have been joined by a cornucopia of organizational shareholders, such as public and private pension funds, union-, mutual-, and hedge-funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Globally, investment assets under management exceeded $80 trillion in 2016 (Kelly, 2017), fueling corporate governance and performance pressures on investment companies. The purpose of this special issue forum is thus to encourage integrative research on corporate ownership and how changes in corporate ownership composition affect corporate governance, as well as to facilitate cross-fertilization of ideas across research streams and communities traditionally focused on different institutional contexts. In particular, we are interested in how the now more heterogeneous corporate ownership structures affect corporate governance mechanisms and their effectiveness in different countries. Empirical evidence underlines the wide diversity of individual and organizational ownership with respect to the type, such as founder, family, corporate, governmental and institutional (Aguilera et al., 2015; Tihanyi et al., 2019; Wood & Wright, 2015), portfolio characteristics of the investor (Bushee, 1998; Goranova, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2010), activism propensity (Goranova et al., 2017), or the country of institutional origin (Kavadis & Castañer, 2014; La Porta et al., 1998; Zattoni & Judge, 2012). Furthermore, prior research finds that different types of organizational owners differ in their monitoring effectiveness (Davis & Kim, 2007; Hoskisson et al., 2002) and in their pursuit of financial versus non-financial goals (e.g., Gómez- Mejía et al., 2007). Therefore, it is important to study and understand the implications of heterogeneous shareholders with broadly speaking different interests, views, and priorities with respect to corporate governance mechanisms. For instance, what are the consequences for corporate 180