168 DOI: 10.4324/9781003014584-16 In this chapter, I outline the main features of the phenomenological approach to implicit knowing, focusing on embodied cognition, pre-predicative knowledge, habits, and horizon- consciousness. Generally speaking, twentieth-century analytic philosophy approached implicit cognition either under the category of ‘knowing how’, construed as an ability or complex of dispositions (Gilbert Ryle 1949; but see Stanley and Williamson 2001), or as nonverbal, ‘tacit knowledge’ (“we can know more than we can tell,” Polanyi 1966: 4; Fodor 1968). The Euro- pean phenomenological tradition (especially Husserl, Heidegger, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Schutz, see Moran 2000), on the other hand, has a longer and more complex tradition of analyses of intuitive, tacit, ‘pre-predicative’ knowledge, centered on embodiment, that devel- oped prior to and independently of recent analytic discussions, although there have been recent attempts to mediate between these traditions (see Dreyfus 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2007; Dreyfus and Taylor 2015). British philosophy did have some mid twentieth-century connections with phenomenology, largely through Michael Polanyi and Gilbert Ryle, who ofered discussions of tacit, skillful, habitual knowledge, but besides these fgures, but mainstream analytic philosophy did not have engagement with the phenomenological tradition until recently largely due to a revival of interest in consciousness (Moran 2011). 1 Phenomenology focuses especially on intuitively apprehended, embodied, skillful behavior. Husserl’s mature phenomenology, greatly elaborated on by the French phenomenologist Mau- rice Merleau-Ponty (who himself was trained in empirical and Gestalt psychology), specifcally focuses on this pre-refective, pre-predicative level of human experience. Philosophy of mind tended to ignore embodiment completely and now that has changed there is increasing interest in the phenomenological contribution. Te Phenomenological Approach Phenomenology as a methodology was announced by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investiga- tions (1901). He went on to develop his specifc account of the phenomenological reduction in Ideas I (Husserl 2014) that brackets what is accidental in the experience in order to arrive at the essence. The key aim is the careful, unprejudiced description of conscious, lived experiences, precisely according to the manner in which they are experienced, without the imposition of 12 HUSSERL ON HABIT, HORIZONS, AND BACKGROUND Dermot Moran