Journal of Cognitive Systems Research 2 (2001) 263–272 www.elsevier.com / locate / cogsys A general model of primitive consciousness Action editor: Dan Levine a, a ,1 b * H. John Caulfield , John L. Johnson , Marius P. Schamschula , c Ramarao Inguva a Fisk University, 1000 17th St., N., Nashville, TN 37208, USA b Center for Applied Optical Sciences, Alabama A&M University, P .O. Box 1268, Normal, AL 35762, USA c East –West Enterprises, 524 Jordan Lane, Huntsville, AL 35805, USA Received 1 October 2000; received in revised form 20 March 2001; accepted 16 August 2001 Abstract We present a simple model of consciousness as it may exist in animals and can exist in man-made artifacts. The minimum unit of consciousness is a brain / body in interaction with a world. No parts of that system are themselves, conscious. Emphasis is placed on structures that could have evolved from earlier structures by small steps each of which conferred advantage to its possessors. The model is functional, so it becomes possible to build such conscious systems. Indeed, we show why conscious systems should be built as well as how humans should interact with them.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Without agreement as to what consciousness is or even whether it is a proper subject for scientific ‘Human subtlety ... will never devise an invention study, beginning such a paper is difficult. Our more beautiful, more simple or more direct than approach is to deal first with the most primitive nature.’ systems likely to be conscious. This avoids the Leonardo da Vinci, The Notebooks (1508–1518). complications of the coevolution of mind and culture and language in people. Think of a salamander – one We seek to learn from nature something that will of Walter Freeman’s favorite animals to model. It prove useful in devising our inventions. In particular, appears to make purposeful movements in a very we ask why she devised consciousness and how she complex world. It seems to choose useful actions constructed conscious creatures from non-conscious over actions that we might expect of an automaton. parts. We are well aware that automata can exhibit very complex behavior (Braitenburg, 1986; Steels & Brooks, 1995), but we want to postpone discussion *Corresponding author. Tel.: 11-615-329-8785; fax: 11-615- of tests for consciousness until later in the paper. The 329-8634. remarks about salamanders illustrate the level of E-mail address: hjc@fisk.edu (H.J. Caulfield). 1 consciousness we address. It indicates that it is a V Corps Science Advisor, Commander, V Corps, Unit 29355, ATTN: AETV-SA (Dr. Johnson), APO AE 09014. poor precursor to the rich consciousness you ex- 1389-0417 / 01 / $ – see front matter  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S1389-0417(01)00052-3