1 Relations and Idealism: On Some Arguments of Hochberg against Trope Nominalism Peter SIMONS † Appeared in: dialectica 68 (2014), 305–315. Special Issue: The Philosophy of Herbert Hochberg. Guest Editor: Fraser MacBride. DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12063 ABSTRACT In a recent article, Herbert Hochberg portrays my ontological position, that of a trope nominalist who is sceptical about relational tropes, as deviating into idealism. Since there are few philosophical views I find more repugnant than idealism, I must either resist the accusation or recant. I choose to resist, by showing how relational tropes are not needed as truth-makers for a wide range of truths, and raising the real possibility that they may not be needed at all, without lapsing into either monism or idealism. Ludwig van Beethoven 1. The Abyss Herbert Hochberg is an ontologist. So am I. Like his admired Moore and Russell, he is a staunch realist and a pluralist. So am I. By ‘realism’ I understand the view that at least one thing exists independently of any minds. By ‘pluralism’ I understand the view that there are at least two things that exist in metaphysical independence from one another. He considers himself a logical atomist, or close to one, or I think he does. So do I. It was reading his 1978 book Thought, Fact and Reference: the Origins and Ontology of Logical Atomism 1 that first convinced me that logical atomism need not be regarded as a museum ontology but as a living option. He considers it important to understand how one’s ontology fits into a systematic theory of thinking, truth, reference and predication. So do I. He considers any form of idealism as a more or less unmitigated cognitive evil. So do I. I would give up practically any theoretical position rather than be pushed into the abyss of accepting idealism. † Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland. Email: psimons@tcd.ie 1 Hochberg 1978.