Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009) 143–165 JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY brill.nl/jmp © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI 10.1163/174552409X402313 Moral Vegetarianism from a Very Broad Basis David DeGrazia Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, USA ddd@gwu.edu Abstract is paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. e essay’s only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that sentient animals have at least some moral status. One need not be a strong champion of animal protection, then, to embrace moral vegetarianism. One need only assume some reasonable view of animals’ moral status. Keywords animals; factory farms; family farms; meat-eating; moral status; unnecessary harm; vege- tarianism When it comes to the consumption of meat and other animal products, there is a remarkable disconnect between what people do and what makes moral sense. is is true even of philosophers and ethicists, whose job description includes critical thinking about moral issues. Most people, including most philosophers and ethicists, are not vegetarians and apparently don’t feel obli- gated to become vegetarians. Few who live in countries where factory farms predominate try even to abstain from factory farm products—the case for boycotting which is, as we will see, especially strong. Some, of course, have argued against the meat-eating majority in favor of moral vegetarianism: the view that we, at least those of us with access to adequate nonanimal food sources, are morally required to be vegetarians (in some sense of this open- textured term). But most supporting arguments depend on highly contestable moral assumptions or theories such as utilitarianism or animal-rights theories. 1 1 I use the term ‘animal rights theories’ in the utility-trumping sense of ‘rights’ so that such theories contrast with utilitarianism (as explained more fully in the text).