Means of Influence, the Joint-Decision Trap and Multilevel Trade Negotiations: Ontario and Québec and the Renegotiation of NAFTA Compared Stéphane PAQUIN * Trade negotiations address issues that are increasingly pertinent to substate governments, leading many to insist on being included in trade negotiations. The increasingly multilevel nature of trade negotiations and the influence of substate governments in the negotiation process is beginning to attract theoretical attention. The Canadian case is interesting here as it allows us to test two recent theories about the role of substate governments in trade negotiations. Canadian provinces are increasingly included in trade negotiations despite the fact that they do not have veto power and the Senate of Canada does not represent their interests. The Canadian case demonstrates that, contrary to the means-of-influence theory, inclusion in the negotiation process is more important than formal constitutional powers. Moreover, contrary to a recent theory that questions the joint-decision trap perspective, in the case of the NAFTA renegotiation, granting veto power to the provinces would likely have been a major problem for Canadian negotiators. This article compares the role Ontario and Québec played in the NAFTA renegotiations with their role in CETA and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) negotiations. Keywords: Trade negotiation, federalism, means of influence, joint-decision trap, Canadian pro- vinces, Ontario, Québec, NAFTA renegotiations, CETA, CPTPP 1 INTRODUCTION The role of substate governments in international trade negotiations is beginning to attract theoretical attention. Substate governments are becoming more involved in trade policy. Jörg Brochek calls it ‘an increasingly widespread phenomenon’, 1 despite the fact that the literature on international economic law tends to downplay Paquin, Stéphane. ‘Means of Influence, the Joint-Decision Trap and Multilevel Trade Negotiations: Ontario and Québec and the Renegotiation of NAFTA Compared’. Journal of World Trade 56, no. 5 (2022): 853–878. © 2022 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands * Full professor, École nationale d’administration publique, université du Québec, Canada. This work was supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I would like to thank Laurence Marquis for her help in conducting this research. Email: stephane.paquin@enap.ca. 1 Jörg Broschek, The Federalization of Trade Politics in Switzerland, Germany and Austria, Regional & Federal Studies, 1 (1 Jun. 2021).