Submit Manuscript | http://medcraveonline.com Introduction The relationship between the informal economy and illegality remains a subject of debate. A large part of the activities within the informal economy can be considered legitimate and legal. Nevertheless, most scholars point to the fluid passage between certain legal, and illegal activities. 1 It is clear that between both kinds of activities a grey zone exists. Within this framework, the position of the performer of specific behaviour is questioned. In criminological terms, the focus lies on the “offender,” and his or her behaviour. This paper will not focus exclusively on this problem, but will also discuss a related phenomenon. We start from the observation that the vagueness between legality and criminality is to a large extent supported by the fact that national regulators use other standards concerning which activities they can and want to consider as legal and/or criminal. 2 Within this framework the position of the public authorities is questioned. In criminological terms, the focus we use is on the “social reaction” of public authorities and their policy concerning specific forms of behaviour, more precisely of terrorist actions. In particular, we discuss the informal economy of the exchange of intelligence about terrorism and how this can be illustrated through reference to the ‘A.B. case’. While it is our intention to discuss the Moroccan A.B. case in the aforementioned framework, it is clearly not our objective to mirror the “reality,” or the “truth” of the different elements in this case, to disentangle the complex interrelations between different persons or groups involved. Even if we wanted to do so, this kind of analysis is impossible, because the world of intelligence is not transparent enough to succeed in such an enterprise, preventing a comprehensive and transparent overview. We are to a large extent dependent on the triangulation of information generated by different media, whilst we acknowledge the partiality of this data and how it reflects particular personal or organisational interests. 1 The methodology used in this case-study was a triangulation of methods. A discourse media analyse was done, complemented with some formal validation by Belgian authorities like the public prosecution and the police. Besides that study, parliamentary ‘questions and answers’ were used as a source of information, complemented by desk top analysis screening the internet and interviews conducted with key experts on this specific case on the one hand and on informal economy on the other. We use the label “A.B. network” for the group under study, without making reference to particular persons, as our aim is to illustrate the dilemmas actors encounter in this kind of intelligence exchange and how they can be understood through reference to the concept of the informal economy. The utility of this concept is explored in the second part of the article having first provided an outline of the A.B. case. In economic terms, trade is defined mostly as the exchange of a commodity between two parties by monetary payment. If there is no payment, the exchange is no trade, but a gift (if this is voluntary), or a theft (if it is without consent) traded commodity has: i. A value, determined by the labour invested in the production on it 3,4 ii. A utility value, determined by the capacity of a commodity to fulfil the need of a buyer; iii. An exchange value, determined by the level of demand and offer on the market (scarcity), iv. A market price, which results out of the aspects mentioned. Trade is registered and regulated by policy-makers and is consequently part of the formal economy. Trade becomes part of the informal economy when there is mutual, 1 The media which reported on the A.B. reflect different points of view, but also differ often about details. Forensic Res Criminol Int J. 2016;2(2):93‒102. 93 ©2016 Devroe et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and build upon your work non-commercially. The informal economy of intelligence into terrorism a moroccan-belgian case-study Volume 2 Issue 2 - 2016 Elke Devroe, 1 Paul Ponsaers 2 1 University of Leiden, The Netherlands 2 Department of Criminology, Ghent University, Belgium Correspondence: Elke Devroe, University of Leiden, Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Koningin Julianaplein 10, 2595 AA, The Hague room 12.55, The Netherlands, Tel 0031 70 8009375, Email Received: January 26, 2016 | Published: March 5, 2016 Abstract The informal economy is often considered an exchange economy. This paper focuses on the question of whether intelligence concerning terrorism is an exchange commodity between different parties. Could this kind of exchange be considered as a form of informal economy? If so, what is the exchange value and the utility value for the parties involved? These arguments are explored through reference to a case study of a Moroccan “terrorist network” and the official reaction to it by Moroccan and Belgian police, justice and intelligence services. This case focuses on the relations between the members of the network itself, but also between different public agencies involved in counter terrorism. We start from the observation that the vagueness between legality and criminality is to a large extent supported by the fact that national regulators use other standards concerning which activities they can and want to consider as legal and/or criminal. Also within official regulatory measures, a grey zone can be observed between the governmental capacity to regulate certain activities, and the willingness (or refusal) to intervene. As such, the paper is concerned with the political economy of regulation, the grey zone between technical competence and political desirability. Forensic Research & Criminology International Journal Review Article Open Access