Political Studies (1994), XLII, 293-305 Pluralism and Liberalism GEORGE CROWDER* University of California at Berkeley Meta-ethical pluralism, as developed in the work of writers like Isaiah Berlin, is the idea that ethical values cannot be reduced to a single hierarchy or system but are irreducibly multiple. It has often been argued that simply to recognize this fact is to have a reason to favour liberal institutions. On the contrary, the plurality of values in itself gives us no reason to support liberalism, indeed no reason to prefer any particular political arrangement to any other. If pluralism is true, the liberal’s best defence may lie in appealing, in the manner of writers like Walzer and Rorty, to the de facro limitations on moral commitments imposed by the existing political culture. The word ‘pluralism’ has several different meanings in moral and political theory. It may stand for the empirical claim that different people hold different beliefs and values, or for the normative view that such diversity is desirable. Again, ‘pluralism’sometimes denotes the idea that political power is, or ought to be, distributed among a number of competing groups or institutions rather than concentrated in a single source. In this paper I shall be solely concerned with pluralism in a further sense. What may be called ‘meta-ethical pluralism’ is a thesis about the nature of value, the idea that values cannot be reduced to any single hierarchy or frictionless system, but are on the contrary irreducibly multiple and permanently liable to come into conflict with one another. (I shall henceforth use the term ‘pluralism’ or ‘value pluralism’ with this meaning.) The view is widespread that between meta-ethical pluralism on the one hand and liberalism on the other there is a close link. The common view, found for example in Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Two concepts of liberty’, is that to accept the truth of meta-ethical pluralism is to have a reason to embrace liberalism.’ I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. The mere fact of the ultimate plurality of values, supposing it to be a fact, has no tendency to advance the normative claims of liberalism or, incidentally, of any other political doctrine. My argument is not intended to undermine either pluralism or liberalism, with both of which I am sympathetic, but merely to clarify the relation between the two. I shall not inquire into the truth or falsity of pluralism. Rather, my question is, supposing pluralism to be true, what are its implications for libera- lism? However, it will emerge that not only does pluralism provide no positive assistance to the liberal case, it also sets certain obstacles in the way of that case. My analysis raises the question of whether pluralism is even compatible with liberalism or with traditional, reason-giving political philosophy as a whole. I *My thanks are due to Henry Hardy, Maria Menitt, Samuel Scheffler and Leo van Munching for their helpful comments. I I. Berlin, ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberry (London, Oxford University Press, 1969). pp. 118-72. C Political Studies Assofiation 1994. Published by Blackwell Publishers. 108 Cowby Road, Oxford OX4 IJF. UK and 238 Main Stmt, Cambridge, MA 02142. USA.